


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CONTENTS

Go World News	2
Grand Minister Kibi and the Transmission of Go to Japan	6
11th Meijin Title (Kobayashi Koichi v. Kato)	10
Game One	10
Game Two	17
Meijin Prize Money	21
Game Three	22
Game Four	26
Meijin Title Winners	31
A Go-Player's Life: Iwamoto Kaoru 9-dan	32
Three Trick Moves	38
11th Gosei Title (Cho v. Otake), Game One	38
Game Two	40
Game Three	46
2nd NEC Japan—China Super Go: Kobayashi Satoru v. Liu	50
Tesuji Magic	52
Good Style and Correct Shape	52
Bad Moves: How Many Points Do They Lose?	53
12th Tengen Title (Kobayashi Koichi v. Sonoda), Game One	62

The cover: A print showing a scene from The Tale of Genji by Toyokuni III (1786–1864). Printed in the 1840's. Collection of John Power. Photograph by Patrick Hochner.

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Go World News

Kobayashi Defends 12th Tengen Title

Kobayashi Koichi has shown that he is back in form by defending his Tengen title 3-1 against Sonoda Yuichi 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in. Kobayashi made a bad start, coming out on the losing end of a centre fight in the first game, but he made a recovery in the second game. He must have been very relieved to bring to an end his losing streak of five games in a row in title matches. Sonoda's aggressively centre-oriented play led to some interesting games, but Kobayashi apparently discovered the knack of dealing with it. The fourth game featured a large-scale life-and-death struggle and was a fitting climax to the series.

Kobayashi has now won the Tengen title three times. For Sonoda, this was his second setback in this title — he lost the third title match to Shimamura Toshihiro 9-dan by the same score in 1977. The results:

Game 1 (13 Nov.). Sonoda (W) won by resig.

Game 2 (28 Nov.). Kobayashi (W) won by 3½ points.

Game 3 (3 Dec.). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.

Game 4 (16 Dec.). Kobayashi (W) won by resig.

Takemiya Staving Off Defeat in the Kisei Title

Takemiya's challenge for the Kisei title made a disastrous start when he lost the first three games straight, but he managed to keep his chances alive by picking up a win in the fourth game. Takemiya has puzzled his fans by deserting his characteristic centre strategy; he also dismayed them by his poor play in the first three games. Fortunately, he has kept interest in the series alive with a plucky win in the first kadoban.

Although Takemiya has not been his usual self, the series has not lacked drama, as three of the four games have featured life-and-death struggles between large groups. It is no secret that Takemiya does not respect Kobayashi's territorial go, but the onus is still on him to demonstrate that his 'cosmic' go is more effective.

The first game in this series made history by being the first Japanese title game to be held outside the Orient. Two years ago, the first game when Takemiya challenged Cho was held in Seoul; this time it was held in Los Angeles, in what was apparently a very successful attempt to stimulate interest in go in America. We plan



Kobayashi looks happy at defending the Tengen title. He was also very relieved to have come out of his slump.



An unusual sight for a Los Angeles park: four of the top go players in the world. In America for the first Kisei game are (L to R): Rin (Yomiuri commentator), Takemiya, Kato (referee), Kobayashi.

to publish a full account of this historic event as part of our Kisei coverage.

The results to date:

Game 1 (13, 14 January in Los Angeles). Kobayashi (W) won by 4½ points.

Game 2 (28, 29 Jan.). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.

Game 3 (4, 5 Feb.). Kobayashi (W) won by resig.

Game 4 (18, 19 Feb.). Takemiya (W) won by 3½ points.

Late news. The 5th game, played on 25, 26 Feb., was won by Kobayashi.

Kato Judan Challenger

Kobayashi's most dangerous rival has emerged as the challenger in the 25th Judan Title Match. Kato will be looking to repeat his triumph over Kobayashi in last year's Meijin title match; for his part, Kobayashi will be hoping to repeat his victory in the 1984 Judan title match, which became the springboard for his rise to the top of the go world, but without having to resort to

the three nerve-wracking half-point victories which gained him the title on that occasion.

Kato will be in good spirit for the title match because he defeated his personal nemesis, Cho Chikun, by half a point in the Judan playoff (19 February). This was Kato's second important success in a row against Cho, following on his win in the Meijin league playoff last year. Incidentally, Kato has been having a certain amount of luck with half-pointers recently. Two of his wins in last year's Meijin league, as well as the second game of the Meijin title match, were by half a point.

Back-to-the wall Fight by Nie

China was in bad trouble, down 4–8, in the 2nd Japan–China Super Go match, but Nie has salvaged their position with another of his great fightbacks (he beat Kobayashi Koichi, Kato, and Fujisawa Shuko to win the 1st match). This time Nie has beaten Kataoka, Yamashiro, and Sakai to take the score to 7–8, which is quite

42nd Honinbo League (as of 12 February 1987)

Rank	Player	Y	C	R	K.K.	K	S	O	O.R.	Score
1	Yamashiro	—	1		1	1		1	1	5 — 0
2	Cho Chikun	0	—	1		1	1	1		4 — 1
3	Rin Kaiho		0	—		1	1		0	2 — 2
4	Kobayashi	0			—		0	1	0	1 — 3
5	Kato	0	0	0		—	1	0		1 — 4
5	Sakata		0	0	1	0	—			1 — 3
5	Otake	0	0		0	1		—	0	1 — 4
5	O Rissei	0		1	1			1	—	3 — 1

Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

a recovery. Japan is now relying on Takemiya and Otake to save the series. The Takemiya game will not be played until after the Kisei title match.

Honinbo & Meijin Leagues

The crucial game in the 42nd Honinbo league was played between the two leaders on 12 February. Yamashiro managed to snatch victory by half a point from Cho, so he is now the favourite to become the challenger. This ended a great run of wins by Cho in the two leagues, but he is not yet out of the running. Nor, for that matter, is O Rissei, who made an excellent debut in his first league, with wins over Rin, Kobayashi, and Otake. Kato, surprisingly, is well out of the running.

It's too early to make predictions in the

Meijin league, but one might note how well the top-ranked players are doing. The mystery this year is the abysmal form of Otake, who had to wait till 12 February for his first win in either league.

TV Haya-go

Two TV tournaments have recently been decided. Otake has won the Kakusei Cup for the fourth time in nine terms. He defeated Kobayashi Koichi in the final by 3½ points. In the final of the 34th NHK Cup, Ishida Yoshio scored his first success in this tournament, defeating Rin in the final by 2½ points. Even when he was at his peak, this title had always eluded Ishida.

Computer Go Magazine Founded

Activity in computer go circles has taken a

12th Meijin League (as of 12 February 1987)

Rank	Player	K	C	I	T	R	Y	F	O	S	Score
1	Kobayashi K.	—					1			1	2 — 0
2	Cho Chikun		—		1					1	2 — 0
3	Ishida A.			—	1		1				2 — 0
4	Takemiya		0	0	—	1					1 — 2
5	Rin Kaiho				0	—		1	1		2 — 1
6	Yamashiro	0		0			—				0 — 2
7	Fujisawa S.					0		—			0 — 1
7	Otake					0			—	0	0 — 2
7	Shiraishi	0	0						1	—	1 — 2

Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

big step forward with the founding of the magazine *Computer Go* devoted to developments in the field. The first issue is the Winter 1986-87 issue. People interested in subscribing or contributing should contact the editor:

David W. Erbach
71 Brixford Crescent
Winnipeg, Manitoba R2N 1E1, Canada.
Tel: (204) 256-2537.

Kido Prizes for 1986

1. Outstanding player of the year: Kato Masao, winner of the Meijin, Oza, and Kakusei titles. For the group of go journalists who make the selections it was a tough choice between Kato and Kobayashi, who won the Kisei, Judan, and Tengen titles, but Kato's 4-0 victory over Kobayashi in the Meijin title was the clincher. This is the fifth time Kato has won this prize.

2. Highest number of wins (7-dan and up): O Rissei 7-dan (37-13).

3. Best winning percentage (7-dan and up): Kudo Norio 9-dan (24-8, 75%).

4. Most consecutive wins (7-dan and up): Kato Masao (13 in a row).

5. The special merit prize: Yoda Norimoto 6-dan (37-11, 77.1%, both top in the under-7-dan group).

6. The fighting spirit prize: O Rissei 8-dan (for all-round good results and entering the Honinbo league).

7. The prize for technique: Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan (Honinbo challenger).

8. The outstanding woman player: Ogawa Tomoko 4-dan (6-1) for winning the Women's Honinbo title, thus breaking the recent monopoly by the Honda sisters.

9. The 'new face' prize: Shinkai Hiroko 3-dan (21-15-1 jigo). This is the first time a woman player has won this prize.

Top Prize-money Winners of 1986

1. Kobayashi Koichi: ¥70,200,000 (about \$455,000)
2. Kato Masao: ¥50,770,000
3. Takemiya: ¥45,160,000
4. Cho Chikun: ¥38,260,000
5. Yamashiro: ¥22,670,000
6. Otake: ¥21,970,000
7. Rin Kaiho: ¥17,360,000
8. O Meien: ¥12,910,000

9. O Rissei: ¥10,880,000

10. Takagi: ¥10,310,000

Go Short Story in Ellery Queen's Mystery Magazine

Readers interested in tales of detection should watch out for the June 1987 issue (available in April) of *Ellery Queen's Mystery Magazine*, which will feature a short story with a go theme. The story will be hard to miss, as it is entitled *The Ear-reddening Move of Shusaku*. Despite the title, it is set in postwar Tokyo. The author is Jon Wood.

Computer Go-playing Programs

The Ishi Press is interested in marketing good go-playing programs and quality 'smart go boards' in Japan and the rest of the world. If you have a good program, we would like to see it. If it meets our requirements, we will purchase the copyright and pay royalties on sales. Please send a demonstration copy, which should be able to run on an IBM PC or a Macintosh, to the Ishi Press, CPO Box 2126, Tokyo.

JAMES KERWIN GO WORKSHOP

James Kerwin, who became a professional shodan in 1978, will teach a 5-day go workshop at the Hollyhock Farm retreat center in British Columbia, July 21 - 26, 1987. Kerwin, a disciple of Iwamoto Kaoru, 9-dan, became the first westerner to enter the record books of professional tournament go when he won the 1-dan section of the 4th Kisei tournament in 1978. The workshop will be followed by dan-level and kyu-level tournaments. This will be an exciting week of go in a beautiful country setting. For registration information contact Hollyhock Farm, Box 127, Manson's Landing, B.C., V0P 1K0, Canada. Or phone (604) 935-6465.



Grand Minister Kibi and the Transmission of Go to Japan

William Pinckard

Go reached Japan no later than the 6th century. It probably arrived even earlier, brought over from Korea by artists, scholars and ex-officials escaping from unsettled conditions in their country and attracted by the eagerness of the Japanese to learn of the culture of the mainland.

The earliest mention in any historical document of go being played in Japan is found in the *Records of the Sui*, the chronicle of a short-lived Chinese dynasty which collapsed in 618. A Japanese ambassador was posted to the Sui capital in 607, the first ever sent to a foreign country. The Chinese must have been fascinated by the visitor and his entourage. Before this court historiographers had depended on information filtering in through Korea, mostly brought by merchants and traders. Now they could ask direct questions, and some of the answers they got are preserved in their archives:

For music they [the Japanese] have the 5-string koto and flute. . . . They have acquired the Buddhist teaching and for the first time have a written literature. On New Year's day they always have archery contests, feasting and drinking of wine. . . . They enjoy the pastimes of go, sugoroku [backgammon] and gambling.¹

By 701 go was becoming popular in monastic circles in Japan. Here is a rule announced in that year, a measure directed to members of the Buddhist establishment who were neglecting their duties:

For monks and nuns who indulge in music and gambling, 100 days of hard labor. The koto and go are not restricted.²

A court chronicle records that in the year 738 an officer of the Imperial Household Guards got into a quarrel over a go game and killed his opponent³ — perhaps the first case in Japan of a game ending in murder.

In spite of such evidence most Japanese believed that go arrived in the middle of the

8th century. There was an old tradition, universally believed down to modern times, according to which its introduction was the work of a certain Kibi no Makibi, known as Daijin or 'Grand Minister.' This statement, made in 1671, is typical:

The art of go began in China and was transmitted to our country by Grand Minister Kibi. Since that time it has spread, and now everybody plays.⁴

As if to make the whole thing even more unlikely, Kibi was also credited with introducing the art of embroidery, the biwa (Chinese lute) and the secrets of the calendar. The purpose of this article is to suggest a reason for the birth and persistence of this tradition.

Kibi was a real person, born into the aristocratic class in 693 and dying, full of honors, in 775. As a youth he seems to have won favor at the Imperial Court in Nara. When he was about 23 he was sent to Ch'ang-an, the capital of the T'ang dynasty, with special instructions from the Emperor Shomu's daughter, the future Empress Koken, to 'bring back the fruits of T'ang learning.'⁵ One of his travelling companions was Abe no Nakamaro, later to achieve fame as a poet. Kibi spent all of eighteen years in Ch'ang-an, then the largest and most splendid city in Asia and the fountainhead of the flourishing culture of the T'ang empire, and after his return was appointed Preceptor to the princess. He made a second, shorter, trip to China as Vice Ambassador in 752. Under the Empress Koken's patronage he became Chancellor of the University and, in 766, Grand Minister of the Right, the third highest position in the government.

Kibi's first visit to China is the subject of a very interesting legend. When it began to circulate is not known, but one of the earliest written accounts of it is a scroll known as the 'Illustrated Narrative of Grand Minister Kibi's Entrance into T'ang,' believed to date from the

11th or 12th century.⁶ It was dramatized in kabuki plays, and one episode is sometimes found depicted in woodblock prints.

It seems that while Kibi was in Ch'ang-an the Emperor Hsuan-tsung wished to test his mental powers and invited him to play go with one of the ministers in the court. At that time Kibi did not even know the rules of the game, but he agreed nevertheless, boldly staking his life against being instructed in the secrets of the calendar. Aided by the ghost of his friend Abe no Nakamaro,⁷ Kibi was on the verge of achieving a one-point victory when the minister's wife, who was standing by, secretly swallowed a stone in order to make the game appear to be a draw.

All the stones were counted, and one was found to be missing. Now, it happened that the Emperor possessed a magic mirror. It was fetched and with its help the missing stone was located. The celestial countenance grew wrathful: the order was given for the unfortunate woman to be executed. Kibi, however, begged the Emperor to spare her, which he did. Later she repaid Kibi's generosity by warning him of a plot which jealous courtiers were hatching against his life, and helping him to get safely back to Japan.

One version of this story supplies a disarmingly intimate touch. Somehow or other Kibi retrieved the missing stone and in due course, upon his return home, presented the souvenir to his wife, wrapped in a piece of silk and cased in a jade box. This lady prudently kept the box but threw the stone into the well of her next-door neighbor, whom she disliked.

Folk memory got the facts a bit garbled, but there is a sound historical basis for much of the framework of the Kibi tradition. We know, for example, that the Emperor was devoted to the study of Taoist magic and that adepts were often entertained at the T'ang court. We know also that go was popular there and that the Emperor himself liked to play. On this point there is an interesting bit of evidence: after the death of his favorite concubine, Precious Consort Yang Kuei Fei, one of his courtiers composed a memorial of consolation. In this memorial the writer recalls, among other things, how. . .

. . . on a summer's day long ago, when you were playing go with the hereditary princess, you

*ordered this subject to play the lute alone. The Precious Consort stood before the stage and watched you. Your Majesty was losing the game and the Precious Consort let loose a cunning animal from the country of K'ang. It completely disarranged the go game and Your Majesty was greatly pleased.*⁸

In connection with the calendar, a contemporary of Kibi's in Ch'ang-an was the famous Buddhist monk I-Hsing, 'one of the greatest astronomers in Chinese history.' It was I-Hsing who constructed the Ta Yen calendar published for use throughout the T'ang empire in 729, the 12th year of Kibi's visit.⁹ This calendar was adopted in Japan in 763, a measure in which Kibi may well have been involved if only by reason of his position at court.

(I-Hsing, incidentally, was a skilled mathematician and possibly a go player as well. He is said to have been the first to propound the famous problem: find the total number of different combinations possible on the go board. Using counting rods and the matrix board system of calculation, the best methods then available, he got as far as the number 847, 288, 609, 443 for twenty-five intersections and an estimate of 10^{208} for all 361 intersections.¹⁰)

As for the idea that Kibi introduced the lute and the art of embroidery, the 'Illustrated Narrative' relates that the ship on which he returned to Japan after his studies in Ch'ang-an was laden with scrolls of Buddhist sutras and Chinese classics, paintings, medicines, tools for divination, gifts and artifacts of various kinds. No doubt musical instruments and fine textiles made up part of the cargo. Together with a head full of learning, this was presumably how he fulfilled the commission given him by the Empress eighteen years before. (It is tempting to think that he also brought back the two beautifully constructed go boards which belonged to the Empress and her father and are still preserved in the Shoso-in Imperial depository in Nara.)

In the early part of the 8th century the Japanese aristocracy had a boundless admiration for the culture of China. What was favored in Ch'ang-an was sure to rise in its estimation also. Go was known in Japan, but it was just one of many games played by ordinary folk such as



Kibi no Makibi (on the left) playing go at the Chinese court. From the scroll 'Illustrated Narrative of Grand Minister Kibi's Entrance into T'ang.'

monks, soldiers and scholars. Very little from that level of society penetrated the remote and cloistered world of the nobility. But when it became known that go was popular at the T'ang court — the Asian equivalent of the Schonbrunn Palace, the Vatican, Bond Street and Park Avenue together — that fact would have given it a special status.

During his eighteen years at Ch'ang-an, studying the classical curriculum of philosophy, literature, history and music, we can be sure that Kibi also absorbed the Chinese scholar's feeling for go and its traditions. Because of his aristocratic background, his experience, his learning, his rank, and his exalted position in the Imperial household, luck and the temper of the times made him uniquely situated to supply those patents of authority which the game would have needed to win the favor of the nobles.

This, I believe, is the meaning of the Kibi legend: it is the record, in folklore, of the part he played in helping to make go esteemed at Court and in aristocratic circles. From this high point of vantage it acquired a prestige it was never to lose as it found ever wider circles

of admirers during the centuries that followed. After the Grand Minister passes from the scene, references to the game grow ever more numerous in court records, memoirs and works of fiction.

Etymological note: In Japan the Chinese character which means go, the game, can be pronounced in two ways, *ki* and *go*. The reason is that in China there was a major shift in the pronunciation of the language between the 5th and the 7th century. *Go*, the older pronunciation, reflects what was used in North China from about 300 to 550, and therefore probably reached Japan some time during that period as just one of a large influx of loan-words from the mainland. The pronunciation of many of these words was considered rustic and old-fashioned in the Ch'ang-an of Kibi's day, and *ki* reflects the pronunciation that had become fashionable (the written character remained substantially unchanged).

When Kibi returned to Japan in 735 he brought with him a young man named Yüan Chin-ch'ing who was skilled at reading difficult texts in the current fashion. This person became

naturalized, taking the name of Kiyomura Sukune, and played an important part in establishing the new standard. The old pronunciations had become naturalized among the lower classes and stayed in use in monastic circles, chiefly in connection with the reading of Buddhist texts, while the new were adopted by nobles and scholars for reading the Chinese classics.¹¹ Thus it came about that *ki* became the elegant word for the game. It lingers today in formal expressions such as *kido*, 'the Way of Go,' and *kishi*, 'Go Master,' while *go* remains the popular term.

(Adapted from "Japanese Prints and the World of Go," to be published in 1987.)

NOTES

1. Watanabe Yoshimichi, *Kodai Igo Sekai*, page 178. Tokyo 1977.
2. From *Zoku Nihongi*, cited in Hayashi Yutaka, *Igo Hyakka Jiten*, page 458. Tokyo 1965. Go and the koto were two of the 'Four Accomplishments' of the Chinese literati, hence their respectful treatment in Japan.
3. Hayashi, page 458, discussed in Watanabe, pages 265–66.
4. Yamaoka Genrin, *Takarakura*, Edo, 1671. Page 52 of the edition published in Tokyo, 1932.
5. Earl Miner, Hiroko Odagiri, and Robert E. Morrell, *The Princeton Companion to Classical Japanese Literature*, page 182. Princeton University Press, 1985.
6. *Kibi Daijin Nyuto Ekotoba*. A full account of the legends surrounding the Grand Minister is in Watanabe, pages 299–316, where this scroll is discussed. Another scholar dates the scroll to the 13th century but says 'it evidently rests on a well-based tradition, for it shows how time after time the Japanese with his practical wisdom and his courage and his sharp wits defeats the tricks of the Chinese officials who are trying to humiliate him.' George Sansom, *A History of Japan to 1334*, page 133. Stanford University Press, 1958.
7. Nakamaro in fact died in 770, having been unsuccessful in his efforts to return to his homeland.
8. Composed by Ho Huai-chih, preserved in *Yan T'ai-chen wai-chuan* and translated by Howard S. Levy in *Harem Favorites of an Illustrious Celestial*, page 168, Taipei, 1958. (I have taken

the liberty of altering two highly anachronistic terms used by the translator — 'guitar' and 'chess.' The 'cunning animal' was probably a pet monkey.) Hsuan-tsung never got over the loss of Yang Kuei Fei and eventually abdicated. She was celebrated in Japan as the original *keisei*, 'castle-destroyer,' a term which became an ironic title of honor for expensive courtesans of the pleasure quarters.

9. Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. III, pages 202–203. Cambridge University Press, 1970. A lunar-solar calendar was in effect in China and Japan until well into the 19th century. Since lunations do not necessarily correspond with solstices and equinoxes, some years had to have 12 months and others 13, while some months had 30 days and others 29. These had to be readjusted every year in accordance with astrological and geomantic principles. The regulation of the calendar was an important prerogative of the throne, so a calendar which got too far out of whack with reality was an embarrassment and could even lead to doubts about the sovereign's mandate to rule. Hence the importance of knowing the 'secrets' of the calendar in antiquity.
10. Needham, page 139. Needham gives the answer as 10^{172} for 361 intersections.
11. Roy Andrew Miller, *The Japanese Language*, pages 101–108. Tuttle, 1967.

Note: Wade-Giles romanization is used in this essay.



11th Meijin Title

Readers of the early issues of *Go World* will remember how Kato dominated the go scene in the second half of the 1970's. For four years in a row, from 1976 to 1979, he was selected by *Kido* as the outstanding player of the year. His biggest achievement was holding the Honinbo title from 1977 to 1979. In the 1980's he has been overshadowed by Cho Chikun, but he did not go into the slump that usually awaited his predecessors as number one. Since he took his first open title in 1976, not one year has gone by without his adding to his swag.

Perhaps even Kato did not suspect that the peak of his career was still to come. Till this year the Kisei and Meijin titles had eluded him: he had challenged once for each but been unsuccessful, losing 3-4 to Fujisawa Shuko in the 1978 Kisei title match and 0-4 to Cho in the 1981 Meijin title match. He has now made up for the latter failure and is only one step away from achieving his ambition of winning each of the seven open titles. Go journalists had decided that this was to be 'the age of the triumvirate', meaning Cho, Kobayashi, and Takemiya, but Kato has forced them to revise this formula. Since he also defended the Oza title, he is the obvious candidate for 1986 player of the year.

Kobayashi's reign as Meijin turned out to be surprisingly brief. After making a brilliant start to the year by winning the Kisei title from Cho and defending the Judan against Takemiya, he went into an inexplicable slump in which he didn't seem to be able to do a thing right. The only reasonable explanation seems to be his lack of match practice before the title match. As the holder of four titles, he had very few opportunities to play. Between 1 May and 10 September, when the Meijin title match started, he only played three TV games (all of which he won). This was of course the first such period of inactivity in his career and it had a bad effect on him. He lost all six games he played in September and October, including the four Meijin title games. More than most players, Kobayashi thrives on constant competition, which he needs to fine-tune his game and keep himself fighting fit. As the commentaries will show, Kobayashi actually played quite well but

demonstrated an uncharacteristic frailty. He let himself be upset in good positions and seemed to have lost his knack for converting a lead into a win.

The other side of the coin, of course, is that Kato was in peak form. Since he had been behind all the way in the league, he considered that he was lucky just to be the challenger; because of this, he commented, he didn't feel the pressure he normally would in a title match. Another important factor in the match was the extraordinary speed with which Kato played. Kobayashi created a stir last year with his quick play in the Meijin title match with Cho, but this year the tables were turned. Kato played the opening much faster and, ironically, this time it was Kobayashi who seemed to have his rhythm disturbed. Despite generally playing fast, Kato showed considerable powers of concentration at the decisive stages of each game.

Even if Kobayashi had been in good form, he would have had a tough time, since he has more trouble with Kato than with any other player. Prior to the title match, his career record against Kato was 17 wins to 27 losses, including eight losses in a row in 1984 and 1985. In title matches, however, he had not done so badly. He lost the 1981 Tengen title match 2-3, won the 1984 Judan title match 3-2, and lost the 1985 Oza title match 0-3. He also beat Kato 2-1 in the 1985 Kisei playoff.

Otake's prediction that Kobayashi would reign for two years at the top is in danger of being let down. It will be interesting to see if he can recover in the Kisei title match.

Game One

White: Kobayashi Koichi Kisei, Meijin, Judan & Tengen

Black: Kato Masao Oza

Komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each.

Played on 10, 11 September 1986 at the All-Japan Airlines Hotel in Akasaka, Tokyo.

Adapted from a commentary by Kato.

Figure 1 (1 - 30). *Kato style*

Black 11. In recent years Black 'a' has fallen out of favour with professionals, for two reasons. Black 11 has a good follow-up at 'b'





Figure 1 (1 - 30)



Dia. 1

when Black wants to set up a moyo on the right side; secondly, Black 'a' gives White the forcing move of 'c', which helps defend his weak point at 'd'.

Black 23 is the Kato style; it takes aim at the weak point at 'd'. There's nothing wrong with answering 22 with 1 in Dia. 1, but he doesn't want to let White get good shape with 2 and 4. Of course, Black could next force with 5, then defend the right side with 7. Black would have no cause for dissatisfaction with this result, but Kato rejects this leisurely approach.

White 24 shows how Kobayashi's style has changed. In his younger days he would probably have jumped to 29 and been prepared to fight when Black invaded at 'd'. Nowadays he prefers to build a solid position and store up strength. Note that one important concern of both players during the ensuing fight here is who will get to play first on the right side (Black plays at 'e', White at 'f').



Kato Masao

Born on 15 March 1947 in Fukuoka. Became a disciple of Kitani in 1959, made shodan in 1964, reached 9-dan in 1978. Kato first made news when he entered the Honinbo league as a 4-dan in 1967, but he went one better two years later by winning the league as a 5-dan (both feats are still records). He lost the title match 2-4 to Rin and this was the first of eight 2nd places in titles over the next eight years. He finally broke his jinx by winning the 1st Gosei title in 1976. He then went on a rampage, making up for lost time by taking 14 titles in the period from 1976 to 1980. He reached his peak in 1979 with wins in the Honinbo, Judan, Tengen, and Oza titles, not to mention the TV Kakusei title. He has maintained steady form since, winning at least a title a year. His longevity as a title holder now extends to 11 years, second only to Sakata's 21 years.

In his youth Kato's uncompromising aggressiveness and bloodthirstiness earned him a formidable reputation as 'the killer'. These days his playing has calmed down (i.e. matured) and he plays a solid, all-round game, but his opponents still find it advisable to avoid tempting him by leaving weak groups lying around.

The first fight starts with 25 and 27. Up to this point, Kato had used a mere ten minutes of his time compared to 49 minutes for Kobayashi. This was hardly slow play on the latter's part for a two-day game, but he must have been taken aback at Kato's speed. Actually the two are

similar in that they play predetermined patterns in the fuseki, thus saving time. (Kato's 1-3 combination in this game is his current favourite.) Even when this fight started, however, Kato did not slow down.

Once Black attaches at 25, the continuation to 40 in the next figure is a one-way street.





Figure 2 (31 - 58)



Dia. 2

Dia. 3

Figure 2 (31 - 58). Kato's clever cut


Black 35 is good style: Black 36, permitting White 35, would be unprofessional.

White 36. White 1 in Dia. 2 would be too docile.


Black 41 was the first highlight of the game. This clever move put Black into the lead, yet Kato only used one minute for his moves from 29 to 45. Of course, he had his opponent's time to think in. Kobayashi was now in a position to appreciate how Cho must have felt in last year's Meijin title match. Since Kato was playing so fast, he had to do all his thinking in his own time (by 45 he was up to 106 minutes).

Why was 41 so effective? To answer that, some extended analysis is required. First, the time-honoured tactic here is to use a sacrifice stone to build a wall as in Dia. 3. This is peaceful but unimaginative.


If White uses 42 to capture the stone with 1




Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7


in Dia. 4, Black has a rude surprise for him. He cuts at 2, but so far from sacrificing this stone he continues with 4 and 6. Next -

Dia. 5. White must play 7, so 8 to 10 follow. If he omits 7, playing immediately at 9 -


Dia. 6. Black wins the semeai with 2 to 6.

Dia. 7. After Dia. 5, White might extend at 11, but then Black uses the sacrifice of 12 to win the corner semeai. This is bad for White. Next -

Dia. 8. White 15 is sente, so White can save his group with 17, but Black secures his outside group with 18. This is good for Black, which means that 11 in Dia. 7 was bad. Instead -



Dia. 8




Dia. 9


Dia. 9. The ladder on the outside is bad for Black, so White can ignore 10 in order to capture at 11. He now wins the corner semeai, but -

Dia. 10. Black still gets a good result by squeezing with 12 to 16.


The conclusion is that White 9 in Dia. 5 is bad. Therefore White will capture at 1 in Dia. 11




Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12




Dia. 13

instead. This leads to a trade when White continues with 3 etc. after Black 2. White 9 is necessary because of the threat of Black 'a', so Black is able to secure the side area with 10. This looks like a fair result for both. Still Kobayashi preferred to capture the two stones with 42 in the figure.

Black 43 was criticized by players who advocated following Dia. 12. The result to 7 is good for Black because the marked white stone is now redundant. If Black had played 1 to 5 in Dia. 13 before cutting at 'a', White would of course answer at 'b'. In that sense, Dia. 12 represents a gain for Black. Kato had a reason for not following it, however. He expected Kobayashi to switch 2 in Dia. 13 to 2 in Dia. 14.

Dia. 14. White refuses to play out at 10, as that turns the marked stone into a wasted move. He would also ignore Black 10 after 2, so Black has no choice but to switch to 3. That means that later White can play at 4. The strongest answer is Black 5, but then White has the tesuji of 6. Black's main concern here has to be blocking off the outside, but now the only way of doing this is to sacrifice two stones with 7 and 9. Kato didn't like the idea of giving up so many points, in gote, moreover. The result to 10 is certainly a big contrast to Dia. 13.

This discussion has become involved, but one conclusion that can be drawn is that if Black wants to cut at 44, he has to do so before playing at 41, as at that stage White would have no choice



Dia. 14

but to extend to 43. In that case, White would follow Dia. 11.

The result to 45 is a success for Black, thanks to his clever cut at 41. However, White can be consoled by the fact that he gets sente to play at 46. The second round of fighting now begins.

White 50. Simply jumping out to 'a' would be too passive. Black would force with 55, then jump to 'b'. Since the black position on the bottom right is solid, White's aim in attaching at 50 is to make Black overconcentrated.


White 54. Kobayashi expressed keen regret about this move after the game. He said that he should have cut at 1 in Dia. 15, then slid into the corner at 3. If Black 4 and 6 –

Dia. 16. White can settle his group quickly with 7 to 11.


Incidentally, note that 1 in Dia. 15 is just a forcing move to prepare for 9 in Dia. 16. Dia. 17 (next page) shows that White cannot do anything with this cut directly.

Black 57 is an excellent move: it prevents the white group from getting a base, in sente, moreover, as White cannot permit Black to connect underneath by crawling at 58. This is the reason why Kobayashi was dissatisfied with 54.

White 58 was the last move before lunch. Kato




Dia. 15




Dia. 16

had used a mere 54 minutes in the morning session to Kobayashi's 2 hours 21 minutes.




Dia. 17


11: connects



Dia. 18



Dia. 19



Dia. 20

11: captures; 13: connects





Figure 3 (59 - 100)

Figure 3 (59 - 100). *Kobayashi survives the attack.*


Black 59 is another clever move by Kato. One's first instinct would be to cap at 87, but White has a good answer in the form of the contact play at 2 in Dia. 18.

Dia. 18. If Black answers at 3, then after 4 to 6 -

Dia. 19. White pulls out his stone with 8 and cannot be caught. After 14 Black keeps up the pursuit with 15 to 19, but White cannot be stopped after 20. However, if Black had a stone at 'a', Black 19 would trap the group. Black 59 in the figure corresponds to 'a' here. Sakata, the referee for this game, commented that 59 was not an easy move to find. Actually, since Black 87 does not work, the orthodox move here would probably be jumping to 71.



Dia. 21



Dia. 22

Black 63. It now becomes apparent that Black's aim is to set up a double attack on the two white groups.

Black 67. If at 1 in Dia. 20, Black can capture the white stone, but White can use the sacrifice to make shape with 12 and 14.

Black 71. Kato regretted this move. Black 71 and 73 look like good shape, but actually the simple extension to 1 in Dia. 21 would work better. After White 2, Black links up with the 3-5 combination, then after White 6 he attacks the group below with 7.


Black 75 was another misjudgement by Kato. In view of how easily White later settled the top group, Kato was attacking the wrong group. Instead of 75, he should have played the 3-5 combination in Dia. 21.

White 76 was the sealed move on the first day. This was very quick progress for a two-day game, but it turned out to be the slowest first day of the series. Time taken on the first day was two hours 9 minutes by Kato to 4 hours 53 minutes by Kobayashi. Kobayashi must have slept easily after sealing this move. His group here had been in considerable danger, but thanks to Kato's strategic misjudgement the group not only lived but lived on a large scale.

White 78. This group does not have even one eye, so it seems to be in bad trouble. If White tried to escape into the centre, he would just help Black to build a wall on the outside and secure a large territory, so he has to try to live on the side. The tesuji White has up his sleeve is White 82.

Black 85. If at 1 in Dia. 22, White captures two stones with 2 to 6. He gets his second eye with White 'a' or White 'b'.

White 86. Ishida Yoshio conjectured that Kato might have overlooked this move. It is not an obvious move because it makes bad shape, namely, the 'duffer's kosumi' (hebo kosumi). Obviously Kobayashi had read it out when he played 76, so he has to be given credit for his skill at shinogi (looking after a weak group). If White were to play the normal-looking move at 1 in Dia. 23, Black would squeeze him up to 8, reducing him to one eye in sente.



Dia. 23

Black 87. If Black plays at 88, he can of course reduce White to one eye but in gote, so White should be able to escape with White 87. Still, Black 87 is bad because it loses the aji of Black 88. Kato: 'If I had lost, 87 might have been the losing move.' White is very happy to make definite eye shape with 88. The game is now close: White has just about closed the gap.

Black 89. Having played 87, Black has to pin his hopes on securing a large centre.

Black 99. Fighting spirit. White, just as aggressive, again tenukis.

Figure 4 (101 – 129). *A crisis for Kobayashi*

Black 1. Black should first exchange 'a' for White 29.

Black 15. Another move that could have lost the game. It is very submissive, letting White whittle down the black area in sente. Correct is Black 1 in Dia. 24. White can encroach even







Figure 4 (101 – 129)



Dia. 24



Dia. 25



Dia. 26

further on the right with 8 etc., but even so Black 1 is bigger.


White 24. White is now clearly ahead (by 2½ points according to Kato's calculations).

Black 25 starts the third round of fighting. This do-or-die move eventually turns the game around again.

White 26. If White compromised with 1 in Dia. 25, he would lose. Up to 4, Black gains about four points. If instead 1 in Dia. 26, White is in trouble after Black 2 and 4. Next –


Dia. 27 (next page). If White 1, Black takes the corner stone with 2 to 8.

White is ahead but he is faced with a crisis. There is a refutation, but . . .



Dia. 27

Dia. 28



Dia. 29

7: connects




Figure 5 (130 – 149)

Figure 5 (130 – 149). *The second upset*

White 30 was the losing move. Kobayashi was in the unfamiliar position of being almost out of time. If he had blocked at 1 in Dia. 28, Black's invasion would have failed. All Black can do is to cut with 2 and 4, but this time it leads nowhere. Kobayashi read out this sequence, but he thought that White 30 also worked. If it did, White would gain by denying Black the cut at 8 in Dia. 28 (Black can use 8 to squeeze on the outside).

White 32 is the vital point, but it is no longer possible to kill Black unconditionally.

Black 43. The winning move. If White plays 44 at 1 in Dia. 29, Black uses the squeeze with 4 and 6 to increase his liberties, then cuts at 8. This semeai is bad for White.

Black 47. This hane, which Black is able to play thanks to 43, makes a big difference to the semeai after 49.

Figure 6 (150 – 203). *An unwinnable ko*

Black 67. The result is an approach-move ko. Since Black has to play extra moves on the




Figure 6 (150 – 203)

*Ko (at 66): 71, 74, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89;
90: at 78; 92: at 68; 95: at 66; 97: at 65; 100:
at 78; 102: at 68*

outside, it should in theory be an easy ko for White to fight, but in this game Black has any number of ko threats against the other three white groups. That means that the game is lost for White.

Black 99. Black 'a' would also win, but White 'b' would prolong the game. White soon throws in the towel anyway.

This was a very complicated but very interesting game to start the series off. Kato took an early lead, but it was only after two reversals that he came out ahead at the end. Following upon the league playoff, he once again killed a large group. At this rate, he's going to resurrect his old nickname.

White resigns after Black 203.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 57 minutes.

Black: 3 hours 53 minutes.

(Adapted from a commentary in 'Igo'.)

Game Two

White: Kato Masao

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played on 17, 18 September 1986 at the Sekitei Inn at Shuzenji spa, Shizuoka prefecture.

The November issue of Kido featured a joint analysis of this game by Ishida Yoshio, former Meijin-Honinbo, and Kobayashi Satoru 8-dan. The Kido reporter is Murakami Akira.

Bad trouble for the Meijin

Kobayashi: Ah, I'm glad it's Ishida Sensei today. The endgame of this game is hell.

Ishida: Leave it to me. I did the newspaper commentary.

Kido: The game ends with a half-point upset. This must have been a painful way for Kobayashi to lose.

Ishida: It's painful all right. Kobayashi was winning the first game too, so there would be nothing odd about it if he were the one leading 2-0. Will he be able to recover from the shock?

Kido: But this is only the second game, so it's hardly begun.

Ishida: No, no. A seven-game series seems long, but it's really short. Make no mistake about it, Kobayashi's in bad trouble.

Kobayashi: This game was clearly a win for White, but Black pulled ahead of him in a flash. I studied the endgame, but I can't make head or tail of it.

Figure 1 (1 - 31). A good fuseki for White

Ishida: Kobayashi likes the move at 7. Compared to 'a', it's tighter, I suppose. Instead of 17, the splitting move at 1 in Dia. 1 would be the usual move. I imagine the moves to 13 would follow. Black then passes the buck to White.

Kobayashi: I also thought that this was better for Black. When Black invades at the 3-3 point after White's pincer at 18, White's thickness is developed on both sides.

Ishida: Kobayashi was of course fully aware of this, so we can't criticize him.

Kido: The joseki move for 24 is 'b'...

Ishida: Perhaps White wanted to give priority to his moyo at the top. Probably he also intended to play 26 immediately.

Kobayashi: I would prefer to make the






Figure 1 (1 - 31)



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

shoulder hit at 1 in Dia. 2 instead of 25.

Ishida: Giving White 2 to Black 7? This would be the usual approach.

Kobayashi: This way Black is able to reduce both the moyo at the top and the moyo on the left side.

Ishida: Another important point is that



Dia. 3

instead of 27, the hane—connection of 1 and 3 in Dia. 3 would have been a good strategy.

Kobayashi: If White 4, Black reduces around 5? Black still has the possibility of 'a' on the left side, so White doesn't get territory there.




Figure 2 (32 – 58)


50: at 42; 53: at 46

Figure 2 (32 – 58). *Queries about the invasion*


Ishida: White 34 impressed me. It's very hard to play a move like this unless your positional judgement is very reliable, and this move does as a matter of fact give White a good game. Kato played this fuseki very well.

Kobayashi: I also think that White is leading.


Ishida: For 35, the knight's move at 1 in Dia. 4 would be the conventional idea. If White 2 and



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Black 3, White perhaps plays 4.

Kido: I suppose Kobayashi plunged in because he wasn't satisfied with this.

Kobayashi: For Black 37, wouldn't the usual idea be to block at 1 in Dia. 5?

Ishida: White links up with 2 and 4, and Black has accomplished little. What about trying the knight's move at 1 in Dia. 6?

Kobayashi: White would probably play 2, letting Black link up.


Ishida: Once again Black doesn't accomplish much.

Kobayashi: Going back a little, how about using 35 to invade at 1 in Dia. 7?


Ishida: White would probably attach at 2, the idea being to connect at 4 when Black peeps at 3.

Kobayashi: After 7, White could play 8, letting Black link up.

Ishida: In either case, letting White link up is not interesting for Black. If he doesn't keep White split into two . . .



Kido: Does that mean that Black's aggressive policy with 35 and 37 has failed when White links up in the sequence to 54?



Ishida: Because to some extent Black is aiming at the whole white group on the right.






Figure 3 (59 – 82). *Subtleties of attack and defence*



Dia. 11

Ishida: If you blocked at 1 in Dia. 11, living would be simple. Black can't omit 6 after White 5, so White can make another eye in the corner with 7. The moves to 17 follow and even this would give White an interesting game, I think.

[Though more moves were played than on the first day of the first game, Kato slowed down a little, taking 2 hours 55 minutes to Kobayashi's 4 hours 24 minutes.]



Dia. 12

7: takes the eyes 3: takes; 6: makes eyes variation would be for Black to descend at 1 in Dia. 12 with 91.

Kido: White can't enter because of shortage of liberties.

Kobayashi: White captures at 2, and the moves to 6 follow naturally.

Ishida: Using 6 to live is slack: Black cuts at 6. In the end, White sacrifices the group and takes the corner in a furikawari. This trade is good enough for White.

Kido: Really?

Kobayashi: If Black attempts to capture the group in the middle by connecting at 102 with 99, he loses the semeai when White connects at 101.

Ishida: It would have been a clear win for White if he had used 104 to capture at 105.

Kobayashi: Since Black's connection is sente . . . It is 15 points in reverse sente for White, which makes it worth around 30 points.

Kido: To go back, couldn't Black have played 103 at 105?

Kobayashi: In that case, White would have made a hane at 4 in Dia. 13. Having to backtrack with 5 is very submissive. There's aji remaining in the corner.

Ishida: The psychology behind the impulse to play 104 is the feeling of being in the lead: the shinogi (securing life for a weak group) of the white group on the right side has worked perfectly, so White feels that he just has to play solidly now. However, 104 wasn't solid.

Kobayashi: Black was probably relieved to be able to play 105.




Figure 4 (83 - 110)

107: takes (left of 106); 108: left of 107; 114: connects

Figure 4 (83 - 110). Saving the group

Kobayashi: The cut at 84 is sente. If Black omits 85, White can attach at 'a'.

Ishida: White lives up to 92, but one major





Figure 5 (111 - 160)
14: connects



Dia. 14

Figure 5 (111 - 160). Kato's erratic play

Kobayashi: Black went ahead with 11 and 13 even though he could have had an approach-move ko here. That shows that he must have been confident in his position.

Kido: The sequence from 15 to 20 is an intricate one. Is this the way it should go?

Ishida: It looks like a one-way street.

Kobayashi: Ah, just as well.

Ishida: White 26 is funny. You'd think he'd just peep at 1 in Dia. 14. Black would probably connect at 2, so White 3 would be sente.

Kobayashi: If Black attaches at 'a' instead of 2, White cuts at 2 and Black has to worry about the threat of White 'b'.

Ishida: When White peeps later at 32, Black resists with 33.

Kobayashi: This time Black will answer at 39 if White cuts at 'a', the logic being that White 26 becomes a small move.

Ishida: White should also have simply played 32 at 34. Black 35 is another good move.

Kobayashi: Kato has begun to play erratically.

Meijin Prize Money

First prize: ¥20,000,000 (about \$120,000)

Second prize: ¥4,000,000

Match fee - defender: ¥6,300,000

challenger: ¥4,200,000

Game fees in the league - winner: ¥670,000

loser: ¥500,000

In the 1st preliminary round, the game fee for a shodan is ¥48,000 (just on \$300) and for a 4-dan ¥64,000. From that there is a big jump to the game fee for a 5-dan in the 2nd prelim., which is ¥127,000. A 9-dan gets ¥204,000 per game. In the third and final preliminary round the game fee (for all ranks) is ¥303,000. The fee in the playoff for a place in the league is ¥380,000. Since both the winner and the loser get a fee for every game they play, the reward for winning is the chance to earn more game fees.


Ishida: A move like 36 would normally be the game-losing move. Capturing with 1 in Dia. 15 is bigger. After Black 2, White switches to 3; Black may destroy the top area with 4, but White blocks at 5 and wins.

Ishida: The game is lost for White when Black enters at 41.

Kobayashi: White 'b' also looks possible instead of 42.

Ishida: Black would then link up with 'c'; the game would be close but still a loss for Kato. White 42 looks like making the loss bigger, but Kato must have judged that it would complicate the game more.

Kobayashi: Making a five- or six-point territory with 51 etc. is big.



Dia. 15




Figure 6 (161 - 200)

Figure 6 (161 - 200). *A surprising way to lose the game*

Ishida: Moves like 69 and 71 show that Kobayashi is convinced he has the game won.


Kobayashi: Black 85 was said to be the losing move.

Ishida: Right. If instead Black had played Black 86, White 'a', Black 'b', he would have won by $1\frac{1}{2}$ points, or, in the worst case, by half a point. If White then plays 85, he answers with Black 'c', White 100, Black 'd'.

Kobayashi: White 86 was big, seeing that it was reverse sente.

Kido: Does the game really get upset in such a mystifying way?

Ishida: Actually Black still had a chance after this.



Dia. 16

Figure 7 (201 - 256). *A matter of luck*

Ishida: If Black had pushed along at 1 in Dia. 16 instead of taking the ko with 17, he would have won by half a point.

Kobayashi: White would cut at 2.

Ishida: Black 1 is worth 3 points. White 2 is




Figure 7 (201 - 256)

Ko (over 1): 6, 9, 12, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 45, 48; 50: connects (at 1); 56: ko (right of 15); White wins and connects the ko.

worth 2.83 points.

Kido: Eh? Is that how it's calculated?

Ishida: Practically speaking, 2.83 points are almost worth three points, but in this game it involves the question of the final half-point ko, so it leads to a difference of one point.

Kobayashi: White should have played 18 earlier as a ko threat.

Ishida: All you can say is that at the end of this game Black had no luck.

White wins by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 21 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 58 minutes.

('Kido', November 1986)

Game Three

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Kato Masao

Played on 1, 2 October 1986 in Asahikawa City, Hokkaido. *Commentary by Ishida Yoshio.*

Figure 1 (1 - 50). *Kato's moyo*

After his bad start, not to mention his bad luck in missing out by just one point in the second game, Kobayashi must have badly wanted a win in this game, all the more because it was being played in his hometown of Asahikawa. As in the first two games, he had his chances of winning.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Black 1–9. The same fuseki as in the first game. White 10 next is unusual, however. Kobayashi must have had some reason to be dissatisfied with the usual extension to 'a'.

Black 17, 27. Kato goes for a moyo. Instead of 17, he could play at 'b', letting White stake out a position on the right side. Instead of 19, he could also block at 20, but that would leave White with an ideal reducing point at 'c'.

White must cut the moyo down to size before it gets out of hand. White 34 to 40 succeed in curtailing its growth.

Kato regretted 41, commenting that it made him thin all over the board. Black 'd' would have given a leisurely game (White extends to 'e'). The idea of 41 was to invite 42, thereby starting a fight in which Black might get a chance to attack the four white stones on the centre right, but that was not how it worked out. Rather than an overplay, however, it may be more appropriate to call 41 a strategic mistake. Kato only spent three minutes on it, hardly enough time for a move that was clearly going to be the turning point of the opening.

Black 47. Black 'f' would be more in keeping with the spirit of 41; if then White 'g', Black could next cut off the centre stones with 'h'. Whether or not this would be better than 47 is another question, however.

Figure 2 (51 – 87). Two weak groups versus one

Black 55 is an important point. If Black answers at 1 in Dia. 1, White captures a stone





Figure 2 (51 – 87)



Dia. 1

with 4. The ladder after Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' does not work.

White 58 stops Black from linking up with 'a'.

Black 61 was the last move before lunch. This was probably one of the fastest opening sessions in the history of the Meijin title.

The sequence to 64 was more or less inevitable after White's attack at 50 in Figure 1. The result is good for White – Black has terrible aji in his corner.

Black 65. Making shape with 79 is the natural move, but Black would fall too far behind when White defended with 74.

Black 67. If at 85 White makes a severe attack at 81. Black needs to keep sente so that he can reinforce himself with 69 and 73. However, White still has the upper hand in the ensuing fight. Each side has an eyeless group, but Black also has to worry about his group below. That is why he makes the 'wrong side' peeps at 79 and at 89 in the next figure.

Black 85. Black would like to push down at 86, but White's reply at 'b' would weaken the black group below.

Black 87. Now necessary to forestall a white peep at 'c'.




Figure 3 (88 - 142)

Figure 3 (88 - 142). A missed opportunity

White 88. White succeeds in linking up with his weak stones on the right; so far from being weak, these stones are now transformed into thickness.


Black 93. The only move if Black is to make a game of it. He has to gamble that White can't press his weak group too hard.

White 102. White could also capture with White 111, but he prefers to set up the cut at 'a'.


Black 103. The sealed move.

Black 111. The group is alive. Black could instead connect at 'a', but provoking White 'b' is pointless. Incidentally, Black's game disproves the English go proverb that 'if you have six groups, one of them is dead'.


White 116 is cleverly timed. Black has to restrain himself from countering with 2 in Dia. 2, as he would only hurt his group to the right. He has to grin and bear it with 117 and 119, but the threat of White 'c' means that Black has to be careful about his play in the adjacent centre area.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Black 121. Again Kato goes for territory. This is the biggest point on the board.


White 122. Dubious, perhaps, as the aji of Black 'd' helps the centre black group. Keeping that group completely cut off by playing the sacrifice sequence shown in Dia. 3 looks better. This may give up some points, but White should be able to make them up by harassing the centre group.

After Black 123 the game becomes more or less even, which means that Black has recovered from his bad result on the left side. The aji at 'd' referred to above is shown in Dia. 4. White cannot stop Black from linking up the two groups.


Black 127. Kato: 'Black 127 was a risky move. I really had no choice here but to play more patiently, answering at Black 128'.

With 134, Kobayashi missed his chance to wrap up the game. The first thing Kato said to him after the game was: 'I would have had it if you'd played the hane, then made a diagonal connection.' He was referring to 1 and 3 in Dia. 5. The continuation is complicated, but since this was the decisive point of the game we shall give it in full.

Dia. 5. After 1 and 3, Black has to play 4 to secure eye shape for the group below. White then



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

7: connects

exchanges 5 for 6 before playing the exquisitely timed move of 7. Black has no choice but to submit with 8, so White can now play the forcing sequence from 9 to 17. Next he cuts at 19, securing a large centre. Not only that, he is also aiming at the placement at 'a'. If Black 'b', he gets a ko with White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'. Actually at this stage, Black can answer White 'a' with Black 'd', as he wins the semeai (capturing race) after White 'b', but then White 'f' will be sente. This diagram would put White way ahead. Instead of 8 –

Dia. 6. If Black cuts at 1, he falls into a trap. White squeezes up to 18, cutting off and killing all the stones at the top.

White loses these sequences after 135. He could still attach at 'e' and squeeze, but his centre territory will be one line smaller; also, he can no longer aim at 7 in Dia. 5. Black has bypassed what should have been a crisis.

Kobayashi was actually aiming at something even bigger. When he jumped to 142, he was confident that he would catch one of the two black groups.

Figure 4 (143 – 200). The attack fizzles out.

Black 43 is a good move: it makes Black 'a' sente, so White cannot hope to kill this group by attacking at 45. White therefore defends at 44, but then Black lives with 45. The question now is whether White can kill the group on the right. It turns out that Black 43 also saves this group. Without the 43–44 exchange –

Dia. 7. White can kill Black by blocking at 1. After 2 to 8, he makes a placement at 9, keeping Black down to one eye. Black 12 is good style, but White can't be caught after 13. With the Black 'a'–White 'b' exchange in place, however, things are different: White does not get away. If White switched to 'c' with 13, Black would get a second eye with 'd'.






Figure 4 (143 – 200)

63: connects (at 60)



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

With 54, Kobayashi resigned himself to letting the black group live. His strategy had backfired. If he was going to play a territorial move like this, it would have been better to play White 42 at 45 at the outset, for this would have forced Black to live in gote with 2 to 8 in Dia. 8. That way the game would have been completely even, the final issue almost certainly being decided by half a point. The conclusion is that 42 was the losing move; in short, Kobayashi was outread by Kato. He staked everything on an attack on groups that were not as weak as they looked.

White 58. White has to do his best to take centre territory, but Black already has a decisive lead.

Figure 5 (201 – 286). Kato goes three up.

Kato had over three hours of his time allowance left when the endgame started, so he had no trouble wrapping up the game after he




Figure 5 (201 - 286)

saved his two 'weak' groups. The rest of the game was plain sailing, and Ishida had no further comments.

The commentaries on these first three games have stressed the fact that Kobayashi had chances to win and have attempted to explain how he let them slip through his fingers, but it will also have become apparent by now that Kato was playing superbly, especially in the fuseki. His successive wins can't be put down just to luck.

Black wins by 4½ points.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 24 minutes.

Black: 7 hours 1 minute.

(Adapted from the Asahi newspaper.)

Game Four

White: Kato Masao

Black: Kobayashi Koichi

Played in Sendai City on 8, 9 October 1986.

Commentary by Rin Kaiho 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1 - 50). The revised Kobayashi pattern

Black 7. Kobayashi deserts his patented fuseki pattern of 'a'. Like his innovation in the third game, this new move is tighter and more solid than the old one. Kobayashi was obviously confident that Kato would play the joseki from 8 to 16 (he's so fond of it that it's sometimes referred to as the Kato joseki), in which case Black 7 makes better balance with 11 than 'a' would. The aim of 7 is to secure the bottom area




Figure 1 (1 - 50)


with one move.

White 26. Kato played the same move as in the second game. As before, he followed it up with the thick move of 28. This pattern has already been imitated, with good results, by a number of other professionals. This time Kobayashi promptly hane at 29 to forestall White 31. Incidentally, this was the first game in which Kobayashi started faster than Kato: to this point he had used only 11 minutes, exactly half the time Kato had taken.

White 32. Having built thickness, Kato goes for a large-scale moyo. This point, where the two moyos meet, is biggest.

Black 37. A very tough decision for Kobayashi. If he tenukis, White will hane at 1 in Dia. 1. White 'a' next would be unbearable, but countering with 2 and 4 just makes White thick on the outside and leads to a dead end.

The only question is whether 37 and 39 are any better than Dia. 1. Black is aiming at attaching at 'b', but this combination was badly received by other professionals, especially Otake, who said that he wouldn't play like this in a million



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

years. For his part, Kato said that he was grateful for these forcing moves. One alternative would be to invade the corner at 1 in Dia. 2, but after Black lives, White will be able to launch a severe attack at 'a'. Otake suggested ignoring 36 in favour of reducing the centre, then playing 2 in Dia. 1 when White hanes.




Figure 2 (51 - 111)

Figure 2 (51 - 111). *The game becomes even.*


White 62 was much regretted by Kato, as the exchange for 63 favoured Black. White 62 is worth nothing if White cannot make a severe attack on the black group; in contrast, 63 expands Black's territory while also offering assistance to the centre group. White could continue with 103 in an attempt to keep the centre black group cut off, but his prospects of killing it are slight, so he switches to 64.

Black 71. The last move before lunch on the first day. Even one-day games rarely progress this rapidly. The continuation to 82 followed quickly. At this stage the game is very close.


Black 83 starts a severe counterattack. After 85 and 87, the centre white stones are trapped. If White tries to escape with 1 in Dia. 3, Black counters with 2 to 8.

Black 91. Black is investing too many stones here. This would be the perfect opportunity for Black to attach at 96. Kato admitted after the game that he would have had trouble countering this.

Dia. 4. White of course would like to answer



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

by descending at 2, but then Black can play the 3-5 combination. The best White can do is to defend at 6, so Black cuts at 7 and captures two stones in sente. If, therefore, White answers at 'a', Black gains by setting up the connection at 2 for later; if instead White 'b', Black exchanges Black 2 for White 'a', then switches to 91 in the figure.

Kato was grateful for the chance to descend at 92. He sensed that Kobayashi believed that he was ahead - 91 to 97 show that Black was trying to wind up the game - but he disagreed. His assessment, that the game was very close, turned out to be accurate.

Black 105. In retrospect, the correct move here was 1 in Dia. 5, followed by Black 3. Black 'a' will be sente, so Black gets no bad aji in the corner. White gets the endgame move 'b', forcing Black 'c', but that is trivial. In the figure Black's liberties are reduced after 106 and 110 and this has a decisive effect on the game. Kato's next move played an important role in his becoming Meijin. Can the reader spot it?



Dia. 5





Figure 3 (112 - 126)



Dia. 6


Figure 3 (112 - 126). *The Meijin title starts to slip from Kobayashi's grasp.*

White 12 was the sealed move. Kato spent one hour 51 minutes on it, which shows that despite the overall rapidity of his play he can call on considerable powers of concentration when he needs to. White 12 may not look like a sparkling tesuji, but that's what it is: it made a major contribution to Kato's winning the game. The reason may take a little explaining.


At this point, the biggest endgame move on the board is White 22, but if White plays there now Black will play 1 in Dia. 6. Black 2 next would be unbearable, so White 2 is obligatory. Black gains just from making this exchange. If later White 'a', Black answers at 'b', getting a similar result to the next diagram. Instead of 12 in the figure —

Dia. 7. If White makes the blunt forcing move at 1, Black answers at 2. White can now use his sente to play 3 and 5. Later White 'a' (Black plays 'b') and White 'c' will be sente. However, Black will continue with 6 to 12 and will win by a small margin.


White 12 aims next at attaching at 16. The



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

latter move does a lot of damage, so the correct answer for Black is 1 in Dia. 8. The drawback is that White can play 'a' forcing Black 'b'; in comparison to Dia. 7 he gains a point. Rather than defend and lose a point anyway, Kobayashi preferred to tenuki, but he should have been more patient. If he had followed Dia. 8, he would have hung on to a small lead. (Also, Black 1 in Dia. 8 does take a white liberty, which might help Black later in the centre.)

White 16 is the climax of the game and of the series. Black 17 is the best answer, but White plays 18 and 20 in sente. This sets up the capture of two black stones, which is a big gain for White. Even if Black plays first, capturing White, the latter has already reduced the corner by two points, or, compared to Dia. 7, by three points.

To demonstrate that 17 is best —

Dia. 9. If Black pulls back at 1, it is hard to find an answer to 2 and 4. If Black tries to kill White, he gets a ko up to 12. Black will have trouble fighting a ko. If he connects at 'a', White will take the ko at 10. If White wins the ko and lives, he has the threat of 'b' next.

Dia. 10. Black 1 is the strongest answer, but






Figure 4 (127 – 163)

White still gets something in the corner with the 2–4 combination. If Black 5, White lives with 6 to 10. If Black tries to kill White by playing 9 at 10, then White plays ‘a’, Black ‘b’, White ‘c’, Black ‘d’, then moves out with White 9. Black’s position will collapse. Instead of 5 –

Dia. 11. If Black hanes at 2, White plays 5 and 7. Black has no choice but to connect at 8, so White lives on a large scale with 9.

Dia. 12. The final move to look at is blocking on the outside at 1. White 2 is a good counter. White forces with 4 and 6, then moves out with 8. He captures two stones up to 14. Black might then continue with ‘a’ in the figure, letting White play White ‘a’ through Black ‘d’, but this doesn’t look good for Black.


Despite his loss in this corner, Black gains something from playing 15, so the game is not yet lost. However, it is now extremely close.

Figure 4 (127 – 163). Time to settle the game


Black 27. A very difficult decision for Kobayashi and he took one hour 42 minutes to make it. The other obvious move is Black 28, but Kobayashi thought that he would lose after White ‘a’, Black 30, White 62.

White 54. Kato sets out to win the game. Simply extending at ‘b’ might be enough to win – but then it might not be. If White 54 works, then all of Black’s recent moves in this area will be rendered worthless.

Black 57. This move lets White escape, but Black has no way of capturing him. If he plays



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

at 1 in Dia. 13, he can cut White off in one direction up to 7, but then he cannot stop White from linking up in the other direction after the crosscut with 10 and 12. If Black 7 at 8, White counters with White ‘a’, Black 9, White ‘b’, Black ‘c’, White 10. Black 1 in Dia. 14 does not work either. White can’t be caught after 10.

Black 63. Black is still aiming at the three white stones, but White’s next move dashes his hopes.





Figure 5 (164 - 200)



Dia. 15

Figure 5 (164 - 200). *Eliminating the last source of anxiety*

White 64. Another exquisite move by Kato. As will soon be apparent, it takes care of his last weakness.

Black 71. Kobayashi was aiming at pushing through with 1 to 5 in Dia. 15. Without the White 'a'—Black 'b' exchange in place, White would have to play 6 at 'c', giving Black the sente move of 'd'. One point in sente would be important in a close game. Moreover, Black would also be able to play Black 'a' in sente, creating a spare eye with Black 'b', so he would not have to take gote here, as he does with 71 in the figure. With his sente, Black could switch to the sente move of 'a' in the figure, and there would be a possibility of his winning the game by half a point. Kobayashi must have been disappointed when this last chance vanished with White 64. At around this stage he must have begun resign-

ing himself to losing his title.

White 82 is the last important endgame move: White's lead is now rock solid. After 82, Black has to add a stone to avoid a seki in the corner.




Figure 6 (201 - 230)

White wins and connects the ko at 30.

Figure 6 (201 - 230). *A new Meijin*

The game lacked the spectacle of the other games of the series, but in a way it typified the 'new' Kato. The outstanding features of his play were his patience and tenacity; rather than to a knockout punch that killed a group, he owed his victory to two endgame tesujis. In his essay on Kobayashi in our previous issue, Kato referred to Kobayashi's skill at winding up a game; in this series Kato went him one better.

Kato thus finally achieved his ambition of becoming Meijin. Although this title has been around since 1962, he is only the ninth player to win it. This final game of the series will undoubtedly be one of the most memorable games of his career for Kato.

White wins by 2½ points.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 45 minutes.

Black: 8 hours 22 minutes.

(Adapted from the Asahi newspaper.)

Interviewed after the game, Kato said: 'I don't feel anything special just because it's the Meijin title. The more titles the better. The third game was decisive. I wanted to finish the series off before Kobayashi got a chance to recover.'



Another milestone in Kato's career – winning the fourth game makes him the ninth modern Meijin. That leaves the Kisei as the only title he hasn't won yet.



'Wako': soft light (a literary term which means keeping one's wisdom and virtues concealed from public gaze, i. e. hiding one's light under a bushel). Calligraphy by Kato Meijin.

Kato's calligraphy should be good, for he took lessons from Sasaki Tainan, one of the top calligraphers in Japan. In September of 1977, just after he won his first Honinbo title, he married Sasaki's daughter, Izumi. He relates that at the time he was afraid that he might lose her to another suitor, as he did not have the nerve to ask for her hand without a major title to his name.

Meijin Title Winners

Yomiuri Meijin Title

- 1st (1962): Fujisawa Shuko (9-3 in league)
- 2nd (1963): Sakata Eio (defeated Shuko 4-3)
- 3rd (1964): Sakata (defeated Shuko 4-1)
- 4th (1965): Rin Kaiho (defeated Sakata 4-2)
- 5th (1966): Rin Kaiho (defeated Sakata 4-1)
- 6th (1967): Rin Kaiho (defeated Sakata 4-1)
- 7th (1968): Takagawa Shukaku (defeated Rin 4-1)
- 8th (1969): Rin (defeated Takagawa 4-2)
- 9th (1970): Fujisawa Shuko (defeated Rin 4-2)
- 10th (1971): Rin (defeated Shuko 4-2)
- 11th (1972): Rin (defeated Shuko 4-2)
- 12th (1973): Rin (defeated Ishida 4-3)
- 13th (1974): Ishida Yoshio (defeated Rin 4-3)
- 14th (1975): Otake Hideo (defeated Ishida 4-3)

Asahi Meijin Title

- 1st (1976): Otake Hideo (defeated Ishida 4-1)
- 2nd (1977): Rin (defeated Otake 4-0)
- 3rd (1978): Otake (defeated Rin 4-2)
- 4th (1979): Otake (defeated Sakata 4-1)
- 5th (1980): Cho (defeated Otake 4-1-1)
- 6th (1981): Cho (defeated Kato 4-0)
- 7th (1982): Cho (defeated Otake 4-1)
- 8th (1983): Cho (defeated Otake 4-1)
- 9th (1984): Cho (defeated Otake 4-3)
- 10th (1985): Kobayashi Koichi (defeated Cho 4-2)
- 11th (1986): Kato (defeated Kobayashi 4-0)

A Go-Player's Life

Iwamoto Kaoru 9-dan

Following our recent biographies of two of the great figures of 20th century go – Go Seigen and Takagawa Shukaku – Go World would like to present the autobiography of a player whose career in itself constitutes a history of modern go. Iwamoto, who recently celebrated his 85th birthday, preceded Go Seigen into retirement by a year, though it was not until he was 81 that he decided to hang up his spurs. In Iwamoto's case, however, 'retirement' is not a very appropriate word – it certainly does not imply becoming inactive. Iwamoto decided to give up tournament go because he no longer had the stamina to maintain his concentration throughout the long working day of a tournament pro (which starts at 10 a.m. and sometimes extends into the next day).

Iwamoto's purpose in retiring was to free his energies to devote himself to what has been his lifelong task of spreading go around the world, specifically establishing overseas go centres. He played the major role in raising funds in Japan to set up the London Go Centre, which was

marvellous while it lasted but unfortunately proved to be a little ahead of its time. Recently he has been working to establish a go centre in Sao Paulo in Brazil (his efforts there are on the point of reaching fruition) and he played a part in creating the go centre in Peking that was funded by donations from Japanese industry. After retirement he served for a couple of years as Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Nihon Ki-in, a post which is no sinecure. In January this year he was appointed a counselor to the Nihon Ki-in. To the delight of all his fans, Japanese and western, he shows no signs of slowing down.

Apart from his international activities, of course, Iwamoto has played a central role in the development of professional go in Japan in the last half century. His autobiography, of which we present the first instalment in this issue, covers both sides of his eventful career. (Prominent persons mentioned in the text are described in notes at the end of the article).

1. Becoming a professional go player

Learning go in Pusan

I was born on 5 February 1902 in Takatsu (the present Masuda City) in Mino County, Shimane prefecture. When I was three, my family moved to Pusan in Korea. Since this was 1905, it was in the middle of the Russo-Japanese War. I think that I heard the sound of cannons while on the ship.

We lived in Soryo, to the north of Pusan. My father taught me to play go. He was a weak player, taking nine stones from an amateur shodan. I immediately got to even. While walking through Pusan, I found a go club. A teacher named Habiro Seitaro had a sign up offering lessons. He played a nine-stone game with me and told me to come every day. I was attending the elementary school in Soryo and when school was over, I would go to the go club, which was in the opposite direction. I improved a stone a month. I could win, so it was interesting.

Every day I would walk to the school and to the go club. It was about ten kilometres, so the



exercise gave me strong legs.

In 1913, Takabe Dohei (then 5-dan) visited Pusan on the way to China. He was about 31 or 32. He played me a six-stone game, which I lost. He recommended that I train as a professional.

Next, Nakamura Zen'ichiro 3-dan, a teaching professional from Yamaguchi prefecture, came to Pusan and played me a five-stone game. It was Habiro Sensei who arranged for the games with Takabe and Nakamura.

Nakamura thought I had promise and said: 'Go to Tokyo and have proper professional training. If you are interested, I'll give you an introduction to Hirose.'

I immediately consulted my father. It was not easy to persuade him, but eventually he gave his approval and asked Nakamura to make all the arrangements.

In April of 1913, when I was 11, my father and I boarded the ferry for Shimonoseki from Pusan. First we made a visit to Takatsu. From Shimonoseki, we passed through the Hibiki Straits on an Osaka Commercial Navigation ferry, then proceeded via Cape Kawajiri, Cape Modoro, and Cape Takayama, before standing again on our hometown soil. At this time there was no train to Takatsu.

Becoming a disciple of Hirose Heijiro

Hirose Sensei's home was in Motozono-cho in Kojimachi. First of all, I played him on eight stones and won, but I lost to my senior disciple Kato Shin on six stones.

I entered the sixth grade at Kojimachi Elementary School. I was the smallest person in the class, so I was right at the front when it lined up. On returning from school I played go. I liked studying and my school results were good, but I found go interesting too. Initially, rather than intending to become a go player, I had just thought it would be interesting to go to Tokyo, but gradually I became attracted to the game.

One or two years after coming to Tokyo I contracted beriberi and I also had eye trouble. I had been unable to adapt to my new environment, but I rubbed myself with cold water every day and on getting up in the morning I walked to Hibiya Park and practised chin-ups on the iron bars. I also practised the pole-swinging exercise. Then I would go home and have breakfast.

This regimen seems to have been good for my health. I became much sturdier.

In this period I also joined the children's study group at the Hoensha.

When I became a live-in disciple, I did everything: from scrubbing the corridors, sweeping, and answering the door bell to tidying up the yard and weeding. Cleaning the toilets was the only thing left to the maids. Not surprisingly, Kato, as my senior, did nothing and was proud of it.

This was the life led by all live-in disciples at the time. When the Honinbo house was flourishing in the Edo period (1600 — 1868), there was a large number of disciples and in the morning the vegetables to go in the miso soup were handed around among the disciples in order of strength, so the weakest disciples ended up with soup with nothing in it.

On the other hand, the teacher in all such households took care of everything for the disciple, including food, clothing, and lodging. To pay off the debt of gratitude, the disciple would work for his teacher for three years after becoming 3-dan. During those three years he would give his teacher everything he earned — his match fees and the money he got from tuition and writing. This was the contract between them and it was a custom established in the Edo period.

The pupil received instruction in manners and the art of go without being consciously aware of it, and this formed his character as a professional go player. Giving the disciple a strict training was thought to be good both for the teacher and for the pupil.

In my case, when I entered the Hirose school, the lawyer Imamura Rikisaburo and the politician Koizumi Sakutarō acted as my guarantors.

I wanted to become 3-dan as soon as I could. The thought of becoming independent and leading a life of freedom after spending the three years repaying my debt to my teacher spurred me on.

Professional shodan

In November 1917, aged 15, I became shodan. That year seven players became professionals: Fukuda Masayoshi, Kosugi Tei, Hayashi Yutarō, Taoka Hideko, Seo Hiroshi, Daigo Hisayoshi, and myself. I was a little on the weak side — I took black against Fukuda and Miss Taoka and

about two stones against Hayashi Yutaro — but Hirose told Nakagawa Kamesaburo (then the president of Hoensha) that he wanted me to become a shodan also, and Nakagawa consulted Honinbo Shusai Meijin. The Honinbo agreed, saying, 'I suppose it's all right. Becoming shodan might spur him on.'

At this time there was not the present-day qualifying tournament, nor was there the points system for promotion, so special connections could play a role. However, while there might be leniency in letting people become professionals, as in my case, the opposite was true as you advanced through the ranks. Getting promotion to the 5- or 6-dan level could be very tough, as there would be people opposing it.

Kato became independent that year and set up his own household, so I became the head disciple in the Hirose school. Hirose Sensei would review the games I played in the youth tournaments; he was the soul of severity and would rain slaps down on my head. There were times I found it hard to bear, but on many an occasion I was enlightened.

As the head disciple, I carried out hard training every day under the supervision of Hirose Sensei with the other three pupils, Kusahara Yoshisuke, Sugihara Ainosuke, and Magari Tokujiro (the uncle of Magari Reiki 9-dan). Every Wednesday we would play in the regular tournament of the Hoensha. By nighttime the fatigue would have mounted up and we would often end the game completely exhausted.

Visiting China

In 1918 Hirose Sensei visited China on the invitation of the warlord Duan Chirui. I joined him later. I was 16. I went at the end of September and stayed for about three months, mainly in Peking. Officially the invitation came from Duan Chirui, but the actual sponsor was the Xijiang financier Wang Kemin.

Duan Chirui called himself 'the strongest player' in Peking, but he was an amateur, so he was not so strong. There were specialist go players in China, but of course from our point of view they were 'semiprofessionals'. The four players Gu Sihao, Wang Yunfeng, Yi Ding, and Liu Changhua were the strongest. Among them, Gu was the best; he had studied in Japan and trained at the Hirose school. They were all employed by

Duan Chirui and received a salary from him.

Duan Chirui was the President of China and the leader of the military clique. He lived in a large military mansion. Early in the morning we would go to his mansion and eat breakfast there, then play go. We would play until around noon, then the President would leave the mansion to attend to political affairs.

When they played with Duan, Ku and Wang and Yi all took black. Actually they were stronger, but the boss would become bad-tempered if he lost, so it couldn't be helped. Even if they had white at first, they had to lose, so they would end up taking black.

At the time I was shodan but against Gu I did just a little better with Gu taking black. Wang was quite old; he played fast, but he was a little weak. Yi was more or less the same as Wang. Liu was the youngest of the four and at this time he did not yet visit the mansion. He was about two stones weaker than I.

They were probably unable to live by go alone. When Duan called them early in the morning, they had to fly there immediately, so they were always waiting ready. On the other hand, when the President was busy with political affairs they were at leisure and played with us. After the President had gone out they would go around to Wang Kemin's place in the afternoon or in the evening to play. Wang was also fond of go. He liked to watch. He would say, 'You play him, with a prize for the winner,' and place a gold coin beside the board.

I would go along with Hirose Sensei. Wang would say, 'Iwamoto, play two games with Gu.' Putting down the gold coin, he went out, then asked the result when he came back in the evening. Hirose and I would replay the games for him, then the evening banquet, which consisted of all kinds of delicacies, would begin. After that, we would play go again.

('Go Weekly', 1-8 January 1985)

Notes (in alphabetical order)

Duan Chirui: Tuan Ch'i-jui in Wade-Giles romanization.

Fukuda Masayoshi (1899 — 1981): Disciple of Shusai, became shodan in 1917. Made the first overseas instruction tour, to Germany, in 1937 (then 6-dan). Thereafter, devoted himself to

spreading go overseas. Retired in 1978, then 7-dan.

Hayashi Yutaro (1900 — 1983): Taught go by father Hayashi Tokuzo 5-dan. Became shodan in 1917. Reached 9-dan in 1969. Won the 6th Prime Minister's Cup, played in 2nd (Yomiuri) Meijin league. The oldest active player, he played a tournament game the day of his death.

Hirose Heijiro (1865 — 1940): While working in the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Hirose studied go. In 1891 he resigned his post and the next year was made a shodan by the Hoensha. In 1920 he became the fifth president of the Hoensha. In 1921 he was promoted to 7-dan. In 1923 he resigned his position because of illness and retired from go and so did not participate in the founding of the Nihon Ki-in. In 1933 he was made an honorary member of the Nihon Ki-in and in 1942 was posthumously awarded an 8-dan diploma.

Hoensha: After the fall of the Tokugawa government in 1868 and the loss of government support for the go schools, go fell upon hard times. The body which played the main role in modernizing go and restoring it to some degree of prosperity in the Meiji period (1868 — 1912) was the Hoensha. It was founded in 1879 by Murase Shuho (later Honinbo Shuho), Nakagawa Kamesaburo, Kobayashi Tetsujiro, and others. Shuho became the first president, Nakagawa the vice president, and Kobayashi a director. The Hoensha did away with many of the hidebound customs of the go world (for example, the four official schools did not permit their disciples to have free intercourse with disciples of other schools); it established a monthly tournament day, organized classes for professional disciples and tuition for amateurs, published a magazine, and strove to popularize go among the general public. Almost all the top players of the period became members, including Tamura Hoju (later Honinbo Shusai). For the first time, foreigners, including westerners, were accepted as go pupils.

In 1886 Nakagawa became the second president. He was succeeded by Iwasaki Kenzo in 1889, Ishii Senji in 1912, Hirose Heijiro in 1920, and Iwasa Kei in January 1924.

In 1922, when Hirose was organizing the

transfer of the Hoensha headquarters to the Marunouchi Building, Karigane, Suzuki Tamejiro, and Segoe Kensaku withdrew from the Hoensha and formed the Haiseikai. The Hoensha took this opportunity to amalgamate with the Honinbo school and found the Central Ki-in (Chuo Ki-in), which was officially established in the Marunouchi Building in January 1923. Strife arose as early as April, however, and the two groups split up, so Hirose resumed the name of Hoensha, while the Honinbo group, under Shusai, retained the name of the Central Ki-in and set up its own headquarters in Nihonbashi.

The Marunouchi Building was destroyed in the Great Kanto Earthquake of September 1923. The new Hoensha president, Iwasa Kei, joined Shusai and Nakagawa Kamesaburo in supporting the foundation of the Nihon Ki-in in May 1924 and dissolved the Hoensha.

Kato Shin (1891 — 1952): Became a disciple of Hirose in 1907 and was made a shodan by the Hoensha in 1908. In 1923, he became the vice president of Hoensha. He participated in the founding of the Nihon Ki-in, left to join the Kiseisha, but then rejoined the Ki-in. In 1931 he became the first 7-dan produced by the new rating tournament.

Kosugi Tei (1898 — 1976): Shodan in 1915, 5-dan in 1936, retired in 1960. His wife and two sons, Kiyoshi 7-dan and Masaru 7-dan, are also professionals.

Nakagawa Kamesaburo (1827 — 1903): The third son of Honinbo Jowa, he became the heir to his uncle, taking his name Nakagawa. In 1849 he became a disciple of Shuwa, making shodan in 1852. In 1879 he helped found the Hoensha; the following year he arranged for Shuho to become president and himself became vice president. After the death of Shuho in 1884, he became the second president. In 1899, after being promoted to 8-dan, he yielded the presidency to Iwasaki Kenzo and retired.

Takabe Dohei (1882 — 1951): Takabe spent two periods studying at the Hoensha, but he spent most of his youth traveling around Japan. In 1903 he was granted a 4-dan diploma by Honinbo Shuei and thereafter became a Honinbo disciple.

He spent most of the period from 1909 to 1918 traveling in Korea, Manchuria and northern China. In 1918 he was promoted to 6-dan. In 1922, he formed the Haiseikai, which became one of the three main go groups of the day. He participated in the founding of the Nihon Ki-in in 1924, but soon afterwards split away and founded the Kiseisha with Karigane. In 1941 he split with Karigane when the latter founded the Keiinsha (the successor to the Kiseisha).

Below are some memorable games played by the young Iwamoto, beginning with a teaching game with Hirose, in which he showed the progress he had made in the two years since he became a disciple.

1. Iwamoto (5 stones) v. Hirose

White: Hirose Heijiro 6-dan

Black: Iwamoto Kaoru

Played on 28 October 1915.




Figure 1 (1 - 30)

Figure 1 (1 - 30)

White 19. Not at 20, as White has no good move after Black connects at 'a'.

Black continues his aggressive play (begun with 14) by making a pincer at 26. This fight decides the game.

Figure 2 (31 - 64)

Black 34. Black must push down here rather than answer the probe at 33. He keeps sente on




Figure 2 (31 - 64)

the left, so he is able to switch to attack on the right with 50.

The game is over after 62. If White plays 'a' after 64, he can manage to live, but since his attack on the black group has failed, the game is hopeless.

White resigns after Black 64.

2. Iwamoto v. Fujita

This was Iwamoto's first game after becoming a shodan at the Hoensha. His opponent, Fujita, was born in 1890 and died in 1960. He retired shortly after the war, having reached 4-dan.

White: Fujita Toyojiro 2-dan

Black: Iwamoto Kaoru 1-dan

Played on 12 December 1917.

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

White 14. The star-point would make better balance.

White 22 is unusual. The ordinary move is 'a'; Black 25 and White 27 follow. Because of 22, Black can invade at 23; White has to counter with 24 and 26, so Black gets to attack at 27. He answers the crosscut of 30 correctly and so takes an early lead.

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

White 54 is too precipitate. Better would be White 'a', followed by Black 55 and White 64. White loses sente up to 62, so Black seizes the key point for both sides of 63. If instead Black




Figure 1 (1 - 50)




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

secured the corner with Black 66, White would build up his centre moyo with White 63 and take the lead.


White 78 is greedy. White should reinforce his left side group by descending at 'b'.

White 86. White has no good answer to Black 85. If at 1 in Dia. 1, he collapses after 2 to 10. (If White 1 at 8, Black plays the same sequence.)

The result to 99 is a great success for Black.

Figure 3 (101 - 135)

Black could coast for an easy win, but Iwamoto comments that if he had just played lukewarm



Dia. 1




Figure 3 (101 - 135)
26, 29: ko


moves he would have been scolded by his teacher even if he had won. For that reason, he kept up the pressure with 17. Of course, he read out all the ko threats before he played it.

Black 27 is a clever ko threat. If White counters with 1 in Dia. 2, he collapses.

Black 33 traps the white group at the top.

White resigns after Black 135.

(Compiled and translated by John Power.)




Dia. 2

Three Trick Moves


Abe Yoshiteru 8-dan

Here are some more trick moves taken from the takamoku (5-4 point) joseki. You may like to try them out yourself in a game or you may run into them on the receiving end; in either case it's just as well to know how to handle them. The first one, in particular, is for many players the first trick move they encounter.




1. Black to play

The pattern to 5 is quite common. White 7 next is an elementary trick move. How does Black avoid the trap?



2. Black to play

Pushing along at 5 before cutting at 7 is unusual. Should Black follow the proverb and capture the cutting stone?



3. Black to play

White 2 is an interesting variation. What is White aiming at and how does Black foil him? *Answers on page 49.*

11th Gosei Title

When Cho lost the Kisei title to Kobayashi in March last year, he found himself without a title to his name for the first time in eight years, but no one expected him to stay that way for very long. As it happened, it only took him four and a half months to correct the anomaly, for he promptly became the Gosei challenger and took the title from Otake three straight. Poor Otake must feel that he is being dogged by Cho, for he has only won two out of ten title matches with Cho. Those two victories had come in the Gosei title, on which he had come close to establishing a monopoly, but now it too has been usurped by Cho. It remains to be seen whether Otake can make a comeback.

By the time of this match, Cho seemed to have largely recovered from his accident, though he was not yet completely back to normal. He was working hard on a rehabilitation program which included swimming every day. We can expect to see him in one or two title matches during 1987.

Game One

White: Cho Chikun 9-dan

Black: Otake Hideo, Gosei

Played in Kyoto on 4 July 1986.

Commentary by Ishii Kunio 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1 - 50)

46: connects

Figure 1 (1 - 50). *Otake lets slip the initiative. Black 1, 3, 5. Sanren-sei is quite unusual for Otake.*

Black 17. Takemiya commented that he would have built up a moyo with 'a', but Otake prefers to take territory while attacking rather than base his strategy on a giant moyo.



Dia. 1


Dia. 2

When White cuts at 18, the continuation to 33 is natural. Black 29 may look slow, but it is necessary to defend against White 'b'. If, for example, Black jumps to 1 in Dia. 1, White strikes at 4. If Black answers at 5, he is captured, so he has to play 5 at 1 in Dia. 2. Needless to say, the continuation to 8 is very good for White. If next Black 'a', White hanes at 'b'.

Black 33. Otake did comment that he should have defended the top with 43.

White 34. An ordinary player would lead out his weak group by jumping to 48, but then Black would be bound to play at 43. Cho prefers to take profit first, then rely on his skill at shinogi (rescuing a weak group). It doesn't often let him down.

Black 49 is too slow: he should attack at 'c'. White takes advantage of this lapse to seize the initiative. He makes a good forcing move at 50 before seeing to his group.



Dia. 3

Figure 2 (51 – 90). Cho settles his group.

Cho is able to look after his group with 52. Black 53 is natural, but Black cannot connect at 60 with 59. If he does, he just makes it easier for White. After 2 and 4 in Dia. 3, 'a' and 'b' are miai for White.

White 62 is a good move. If Black plays 63 at 'a', White will move into his moyo with 72, Black 63, White 'b'.





Figure 2 (51 – 90)




Dia. 4

White seems to get a good position with 64, so Black makes a forceful attack with 65 and 67. White defends well, however, so the attack is not successful. With 65, Black really should just have extended to 'c' on the left side.

White 74 is a clever move. Black has no choice but to answer at 75, so White is able to make an effective hane at 76. If next Black hanes at 1 in Dia. 4, White forces his way out into the open, then counterattacks at 14. This is no good for Black.

Black 77. Conventional moves are no longer good enough. White 78 in reply is perfectly timed, however. If Black answers at 84, White's peep at 'd' will be a nuisance.


Black 79 is perhaps too docile. Ishii advocated invading at 1 in Dia. 5 (next page). If White continues by capturing two stones with 4 and 6,




Dia. 5

Black attacks at 7 and might still have a chance. After the game Otake admitted that 79 showed a lack of fighting spirit.


White 88 and 90 are not very big, but they have the advantage of eliminating the aji of 'e' in the centre. Cho had probably already calculated that this was enough to win.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8




Figure 3 (91 – 136)

Figure 3 (91 – 136). Playing safe

Black goes all out with 91 and 93. In reply, White plays safe with 96. He could also have followed Dia. 6. After the forced sequence to 10, White sets up the ko in Dia. 7. This would have been bad for Black, according to Otake.

Otake got a large centre territory up to 109, making the game close, but Cho was full of confidence when he played 110.

Figure 4 (137 – 196). Cho makes a good start.

Black 37 is a reasonable probe, but 39 is bad. White gains from answering on the outside at 40, so if Black cannot live in the corner he loses something from the 39–40 exchange. Dia. 8




Figure 4 (137 – 196)

73: ko

shows that Black cannot get two eyes in the corner: White 4 and 12 make a 'bent four'.

White was 3½ points ahead when Otake resigned. 'All thickness and no territory,' he muttered to Cho. 'You played well.' Otake lost because he failed to keep up the pressure on the weak white group in the centre. Cho won because of his mastery of the middle game. He was the old Cho again.

Black resigns after White 196.

(Adapted from the Kyoto newspaper.)

Game Two

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Cho Chikun

Time: five hours each

Played on 17 July 1986 at the Wakura spa in Ishikawa prefecture.

The commentary on the second game consists of a round-table discussion among Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan, Sato Masaharu 9-dan, and a Kido reporter, Murakami Akira. It took place after the series was concluded.

Otake was in bad form.

Kido: Otake lost three straight to Cho after holding the title for six years in a row. I heard that his health hasn't been very good recently.

Sato: He didn't seem to be able to concentrate really hard.

Kido: If you can't concentrate . . . In this game he didn't think very much about whether the black group could have been captured. He had plenty of time, though. How about it — couldn't that group have been captured?

Yamabe: Apparently not.

Sato: It couldn't be captured.

Yamabe: When it comes to players of that class, they know by intuition, without reading it all out, about that kind of thing. Chikun was confident he could save it, and Otake knew he couldn't capture it.

Kido: Really?

Yamabe: Top-class players know. With me, my intuition tells me things, but it's wrong. I play one way in the belief I can get life for a group and it dies on me.

Kido: Another point that attracted attention about this game was Black's fuseki.

Yamabe: Up to 27, all the moves were on the 3rd line or below.

Sato: Chikun tries out various different fusekis.

Yamabe: Chikun and Otake are the players who experiment most in the fuseki.

Kido: Takemiya plays nothing but the star-point.

Sato: Playing two 3-3 points with Black is unusual, I think. Isn't this the first time Cho has tried it?

Yamabe: Even so, the fact that he can adopt such an extreme strategy is a sign that he's pretty much regained form. My feeling is that he's got his sights set squarely on the Meijin and Kisei titles. [This discussion took place before the last round of the 1986 Meijin league was played.]

Kido: His engine has started.

Sato: Shall we start?

Yamabe: I'll play out the moves. I can't get in the mood unless I'm holding a stone.

Figure 1 (1 – 20). A low fuseki

Sato: This is the first time I've seen the splitting move (wariuchi) at 5.




Figure 1 (1 – 20)

Yamabe: It's the first time I've seen this splitting move played on the fifth move.

Kido: Since the advent of the large komi [the switch from 4½ to 5½ points], the tendency has been for Black to try to make full use of the advantage of playing first by starting a fight, but in this fuseki Black is trying to take the lead in territory.

Yamabe: You can't necessarily say that just because he played on the 3rd line. Fighting will start regardless.

Sato: Because Chikun has confidence in his shinogi [ability to look after weak groups], so he plays all out.

Kido: He went all out with 11, didn't he?

Yamabe: That's the instinctive move here. It's hard to find a point on the right side because the two 3-3 stones make it too open.

Kido: Black 'a' also looks possible for 13.


Sato: Of course it is, but Black is following a consistent strategy of playing low.

Kido: Is the direction in which Black crawls with 15 fixed?


Yamabe: Both directions seem possible.

Sato: If Black 1 in Dia. 1 (next page), then 2 to 6 perhaps. Compared to 19 in the figure, Black 3 is one line to the right. To that extent it is less effective in offering assistance to the marked stone.

Kido: The result in the figure makes it easier for Black to link up underneath with 'b'. Another point: what about blocking at 1 in Dia. 2 instead of 18?



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Yamabe: When Black plays 2, extending to 3 is not very good for White. Black jumps to 4 and the white groups on both sides are thin.

Kido: Can Black aim at invading at 'a' in Dia. 2?

Yamabe: Yes, but extending to 'b' with 3 would be insipid.

Sato: If Takemiya had white in this fuseki, he would probably be estatic.

Yamabe: There are players who like to invade at the 3-3 and players who like to be invaded at the 3-3. With two such extreme positions, one of them must be wrong theoretically . . . Or maybe they're both wrong. (laughter) However, the fact that you can't get an answer to this question . . .

Sato: That's the strange thing about go.

Figure 2 (21 – 65). *A dubious strategy?*

Kido: Is Black 21 the right way to play here?

Sato: I couldn't play like this. To start with, I'd want to poke my head out at 26.

Yamabe: The point is that if Black jumps to 1 in Dia. 3, it's obvious that White will make the kosumi at 2. As far as he's concerned, handing the opponent a territorial move like 2 on a platter is unbearable. No, if I oversimplify like this, Chikun might scold me.

Sato: Still, White is not dissatisfied with the result to 26.

Yamabe: I agree. If you count it up, Black






Figure 2 (21 – 65)



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

doesn't get an extraordinary amount of territory. If you assume Black 61, he only has about 50 points.

Kido: With 29, he played above the 3rd line for the first time.

Yamabe: I have the feeling that the exchange of 29 for 30 makes 29 a bit of a forcing move [i.e. Black gains more from 29 than White does from 30].


Sato: Apparently the opinion was expressed that White should have made the shoulder hit at 'a' instead of 28, but I wonder. White 'a' looks funny when Black pushes up at 'b'. To me, attaching at 1 in Dia. 4 feels right.

Yamabe: The attachment looks better. If Black 2, White plays 3 to 9. This looks unpleasant for Black.

Sato: It is unpleasant. Should Black pull back at 5 with 2? In this case, White 1 becomes a forcing move.

Yamabe: What about the 32-33 exchange?

Sato: I would prefer to play 1 in Dia. 5. At



Dia. 5

this stage Black would probably answer at 2. After 4, White defends at 5 . . . I feel that I'd prefer to have white.

Yamabe: It doesn't look bad for White. When I first saw 32, I admired it as a really characteristic Otake move, but the more I look at it the better 33 looks.

Sato: For 34, following Dia. 5 is probably still better. He could then peep at 37, forcing Black 'c', then play 36. This would still be an interesting game for him.

Yamabe: It really seems that White's two large-knight moves were dubious.

Sato: White 34 might be the cause of White's loss.

Yamabe: The 35-41-43 combination was spectacular. I was filled with admiration.

Sato: If you look at the result to 42, the stones at 32 and 34 are overlapping each other a little.

Yamabe: Whatever you may say, driving this deep a wedge (up to 49) into White's position is big; the territorial balance has been upset.


White 50 and 52 are natural. It would be out of the question to let Black block at 52.

Kido: By this stage, White 56 is no longer sente.


Yamabe: I also admired Cho's 57.

Kido: Is it such a good move?

Yamabe: If White played at 'd', he would make about ten points here; by attacking with 57, Black not only nips that in the bud, he also offers moral support to the black group on the top left.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Sato: White 58 must have been painful.

Yamabe: It's the honte (proper move), I suppose, but Black 59 and 61 work perfectly. If I were playing, I'd be tempted to say, 'Who gives a damn?' and try 1 in Dia. 6. If the sequence to 7 follows, this doesn't look so bad for White. Or perhaps White could force with White 1 at 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', and just wait to see what Black does at the bottom . . .

Kido: Mr. Sato, how would you play with 58?


Sato: It's beyond me. In any case, with his top area destroyed, White's having a hard time of it . . . The way the game has developed, White will lose on territory even if he blocks at 'e' with 62.

Kido: The peep at 62 is a preliminary to attacking the black group on the top left, isn't it?

Yamabe: That's right. It's hard for Black to connect at 'f', so White probes to see what he does.

Sato: Black 63 is not an easy move to find. Usually you'd push down at 'g'.

Yamabe: Next White attaches at 64, but I'd prefer to attach at 1 in Dia. 7. If Black 2, White plays 3 to 7 — this looks good for White. Therefore, Black will answer at 2 in Dia. 8 (next page), but White connects on the outside at 3, then pushes through at 7. He can't win on territory anyway . . . If Black continues with 'a', White now attaches at 'b'. Of course, if you tell me that even this way Black won't die, then there's nothing for it but to throw in the sponge.



Dia. 8

Kido: White 64 gives up the blocking move at 'e' — it must take a lot of determination to play here.




Figure 3 (66 - 102)
86: connects


Figure 3 (66 - 102). *The game enters a labyrinth.*

Sato: White 66 is a do-or-die move.


Yamabe: Even if White connected at 67 with 66, Cho, being Cho, would probably answer at Black 66. (laughter)

Kido: When Black takes profit regardless with 69 and 71, White can't be blamed for losing his temper.


Sato: I wonder if White could use 70 to connect at 1 in Dia. 9. If Black is kind enough



Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

to block at 'a', then White extends at 3, having created some useful aji here.

Yamabe: If, for example, Black just plays 2 and 4, it looks bad for White. He could cut with the 5-7 tesuji, but since the black group on the side is alive . . .

Kido: White 72 looks like an attempt to capture the group.

Sato: The game is lost if he can't.

Yamabe: Black 77 and 79 are clever moves.

Sato: If White plays 80 at 81, Black 'a' becomes sente, making it easier for Black to live.

Yamabe: Black 89 makes things a little difficult for Black. If he had played 1 in Dia. 10, he would have lived easily.

Sato: That's right. If White tightens his encircling net with 2, Black plays 3 to 11.

Yamabe: White has no time to strengthen the outside, so would he try 1 in Dia. 11?


Sato: Black will probably cut at 2; if 3, he descends at 4 . . .

Kido: If White 3 at 4, Black can get eyes by forcing with Black 3, then playing Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.

Yamabe: I wonder what Black will do if White turns at 5 . . . Ah, he can attach at 6.

Sato: The attachment is a clever move. White can no longer enter at 'd', so Black lives up to 10.

Yamabe: If Black thoughtlessly answers at 1 in Dia. 12, he's in danger. Because White can answer 3 by descending at 4.



Dia. 12

Kido: He can now go in at 'a'. The group drops off.

Sato: I heard that Otake commented, 'Instead of 94, I should have connected solidly in the centre,' but surely Black lives easily if White doesn't play 94.


Yamabe: That comment must be wrong. For example, if White jumps to 1 in Dia. 13, Black can link up on the edge with 2. After 11, Black connects at 12 and is alive.

Sato: He threatens to link up with 'a'; if White stops that, he makes the diagonal connection at 'b'.


Kido: Oh. If White 'c', he's safe with 'd'.

Yamabe: If White is going to play in the centre, what about connecting at 1 in Dia. 14?


Kido: What happens next?



Dia. 13



Dia. 14



Dia. 15


Yamabe: Black links up with 2 and 4; after 7, attaching at 8 is the shape move. What will White do?

Sato: Simply connecting at 1 in Dia. 15 looks best . . . Black attaches at 2, perhaps.

Yamabe: He fights a ko with 4 and 6. If he gets to connect at 14, it's a semeai (capturing race) with the white group at the top.

Sato: White has to defend the cutting point at 'a'. Black then jumps in at 'b' . . .

Yamabe: This is hopeless for White.



Dia. 16

Kido: I heard that instead of connecting at 102, White could have pushed down at 1 in Dia. 16.

Sato: Black 2 is probably the vital point. White plays 3, perhaps.

Yamabe: I went over this at home. Black lives fairly simply. How did it go? I've forgotten . . . Ah, now I remember. Pushing through and cutting with 4 and 6 does it.

Sato: Of course. Black gets one eye with 14, and next 'a' and 'b' are miai.

Kido: If Black 'b', White 'c', and Black 'd' are played, then blocking at 'e' becomes sente for Black, so he gets another eye with Black 'f'.




Figure 4 (103 - 131)
30: connects

Figure 4 (103 - 131). *Big groups don't die.*

Kido: Is the group safe after 9 and 11?

Sato: Even if White connects at 13 instead of 12, letting Black cut with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' is bad for White.

Yamabe: The only thing is that White could have staked the game on fighting with 1 in Dia. 17 instead of 8. Of course, it wouldn't succeed, but . . . White collapses after 2 to 24.

Kido: Even if White tries to flee with 'a', Black ataris at 'b', then attaches at 'c'.

Sato: Wait a minute. Instead of 7, what if Black hanes at 1 in Dia. 18?

Yamabe: I'm waiting. This time Black cuts with 2 and 4 and makes the diagonal attachment at 10.

Kido: It's a snapback. This is what they mean by 'Yamabe tesuji magic'. (laughter)


Sato: Capturing a group is not so easy.

Yamabe: That's why I often play a shinogi strategy, but recently I'm getting senile and my groups often get caught.


Figure 5 (132 - 163). *Success for a shinogi strategy*

White resigns after Black 163.

('Kido', September 1986)



Dia. 17



Dia. 18




Figure 5 (132 - 163)

Game Three

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Otake Hideo

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 23 July 1986.



Once again Cho's unmatched skill at shinogi or handling weak groups proves its worth. With two convincing wins, he had an iron grip on the Gosei title.





Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Figure 1 (1 – 50). Cho's moyo

White 14. A Shuko innovation – the standard move is White 'a'. At this early stage of the game, Black answers 14 at 15. White is satisfied with this exchange for two reasons: it decreases the value of Black 'b' (which would have been a good alternative to 13) as Black becomes over-concentrated), and White can later live in the corner. In other words, the 14–15 exchange



Dia. 1

forestalls Black 'b' in sente, enabling White to switch to 16. If Black plays 15 at 1 in Dia. 1, White will crosscut at 2, atari at 4 and 6, then switch elsewhere.

White 28. In contrast to the second game, this time Cho has gone for a moyo. This is something he does once in a while with white.

Black 29 was solid, but Otake later criticized it as slack, as it let White seize the initiative with 30 and 32. Otake commented that he should have played 29 at 32, which he called a Kobayashi Koichi-style move.

White 42 is very skilful. If instead White hanes to the right of 41, Black will build thickness that will hurt White's moyo. White had seemed to be under pressure after Black 41, but up to 46 he not only settles his group but also takes over ten points of territory. After the game Otake lamented: 'Letting Black take the bottom area would be the standard approach in this fuseki. Instead of which, look what Cho did.'




Figure 2 (51 - 80)

Figure 2 (51 - 80). *A far-reaching strategy.*

Black 55 is too ambitious: it makes it too easy for White to live inside Black's moyo at the top. Otake commented that he should have played 55 at 'a' or 62. In that case, Cho responded, he would probably have started operations with White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'.

White 62. Cho's only bad move of the game: White 'e' would be far superior for settling the group. Nonetheless, the game now looks quite good for White.

Black 63. This invasion is triggered by White's bad move at 62, though amateurs may have to take this statement on faith. Black could attack the white group at the top immediately, but saving a solitary group under attack is not very difficult. Black 63 is part of a whole-board strategy which aims at driving weak white groups towards each other so that Black can make a double attack. Alternatively, Black will be happy if he can get a ko, as he has a wealth of ko threats at the top.

Cho was well aware of the aims of Otake's global strategy, so he played as solidly as possible with 68 etc. The lowly fashion in which White links up his groups with 76 and 80 may not seem anything to boast of, but his main concern is not to hurt the group at the top.

Figure 3 (81 - 116). *Cho's groups can't be killed.*

Black 81, 83. Killing this group is Black's last chance.





Figure 3 (81 - 116)
103: at 91



Dia. 2


Black 85. Black could capture two stones with 'a', but White would force with 115, then lead his group out with 'b'. Black prefers to go for the whole group.

Black 105. Black 1 in Dia. 2 would be more solid, but then White would also be quite solid after 2 and 4. Black would now have little chance of catching the group.

White 106. White could also save the group with White 115, Black 106, White 'c', but 106 settles the shape and simplifies the game.

Black 111. Otake had slipped up in his analysis. He had thought that he could cut at 1 in Dia. 3 with 111. However, White could then come out at 2; the moves to 5 are forced, whereupon White captures Black with the clever move of 6. Otake had expected White 2 at 'a', which would have made Black 3 good.

Otake woke up to his mistake in reading when Cho played 110, but by then the game was over. When Cho forced his way out with 116, he resigned. If next Black 'a', then White 'd' is unbearable; if instead Black blocks at 'e', then White just has to cut at 'd' or to the left of



Dia. 3

'e'.

For the third time in as many games, Otake

had tried but failed to kill a large Cho group. He was unable to transform himself into a 'killer'.

The date of this game was 23 July; Otake resigned at 7.23 p.m.; 7 and 23 make 30: it was Cho's 30th birthday. He could not have asked for a better birthday present, though that could hardly have been Otake's intention.

Black resigns after White 116.


(Adapted from the Kyoto newspaper. Translated by John Power.)

Three Trick Moves


Continued from Page 38.

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. One's natural instinct is to push through the holes in White's shape with 1 and 3. This is OK: the mistake is to atari next at 5. Black can't connect when White counters with 6, so he collapses after 8.




Dia. 1: tricked




Dia. 2: good for White

Dia. 2. If instead Black cuts at 3, White 4 is a severe answer. Black lives in the corner by forcing with 5, but White gets superb thickness on the outside.

Dia. 3. The correct counter to the trick move is to cut on the bottom at 5 to prevent White from playing the atari at 6 in Dia. 1. Next –



Dia. 3: refutation




Dia. 4: good for Black


Dia. 4. White has to defend on the outside, so Black extends at 2. Black takes adequate profit while White still has two cutting points in his position. Instead of 1 –

Dia. 5. White 1 is rash. Black gets a ponnuki on the outside which is far superior to White's

ponnuki on the edge. This is worse for White than Dia. 4.



Dia. 5: a mistake




Dia. 1: tricked


Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Black 1 is what White wants. He promptly takes the corner with 2 and 4. White has gained from the exchange of the marked stones. This becomes clear if we compare the result with the joseki.

Dia. 2. In the usual joseki, White cuts at 1 (instead of pushing along at 6), then takes the corner with 3 and 5. This way Black gets to push up at 6, which is a key point in the joseki. Next, Black can aim at 'a' and 'b'.




Dia. 2: the joseki




Dia. 3: correct

Dia. 3. Connecting at 1 is the only move. Once White has played the marked stone in Dia. 1, Black can't give up the corner. Of course, a fresh problem arises when White continues with the tesuji of 3. Before turning the page, think of the right and the wrong answer.




Dia. 4: correct




Dia. 5: heavy

Dia. 4. Capturing with 1 is correct. If then White 2, Black cuts at 3 and starts a fight. Black moves into the centre one step ahead of White with 7 and 9, so he need not fear this fight.

Dia. 5. Moving out with 1 is dubious. Black's stones on the outside are heavy and his corner is weak. Black has to play 5 and 7 to live, but that only helps White to build thickness on the outside.



Dia. 1: bad




Dia. 2: worse


Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Black 1 looks solid, but it is just what White wants. White 2 effectively stops Black's advance. Even if Black plays 3 and 5, then White 6 works well. If Black 'a', White 'b' puts him on the spot.


Dia. 2. Black 1 is even worse: White gets an ideal result with 2 to 6. Black 3 at 4 would be



Dia. 3: correct



Dia. 4: satisfactory



Dia. 5: alternative

a little better, but still the result is bad for Black when White takes the corner with 'a'.

Dia. 3. Black must push up with 1, then make a diagonal connection with 3. White's problem is the cutting point at 'a'. The aim of pushing up at 1 was to create this defect; if Black played 1 at 3, White would make good shape by connecting at 1. Next —

Dia. 4. White probably has to connect at 1, so Black can move out at his leisure with 2. His corner is bigger than it looks, as White can't attach at 'a'.

Dia. 5. When the corner is more important than the side, Black can play the solid move of 1. When White connects at 2, Black again connects solidly at 3. In certain positions, this might be preferable to Dias. 3 and 4.

(*'Let's Go'*, November 1984)

2nd NEC Japan-China Super Go

Kobayashi Satoru v. Liu

As we go to press, Nie is making yet another of his patented fightbacks and, with three straight wins, is threatening to turn defeat into victory. We hope to present some of his games in a later issue. In the meantime, here is another game from the winning streak by Kobayashi Satoru that came very close to wrapping up the series for Japan. His opponent, Liu Xiaoping 8-dan, has been one of the top half dozen players in China for the last three or four years, though surprisingly he failed to make the touring team to Japan in 1986.

White: Liu Xiaoping 8-dan

Black: Kobayashi Satoru 8-dan

Played in Peking on 27 August 1986.

Commentary by Fujisawa Shuko.

Figure 1 (1 – 70)

The 12–14 combination is seen occasionally, but the continuation seems to be a new pattern.

Black 31 is a little too thin and doesn't have a good follow-up. Black should play at 'a' and aim at pushing down at 'b'.

White 48. Shuko advocated blocking at 'c'




Figure 1 (1 - 70)






Figure 2 (71 - 121)

115: connects



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

instead to close off the side. White could then aim at securing all this area with 62; if Black then cut at 48, White could be satisfied to answer at 'd'.

White 52 is a bad pincer. Black settles himself in sente with 53 to 57, so he gets to take the large point of 59. White should have played 52 at 'e'; if then Black 'f', White could extend to 'g'. Alternatively, he could play 52 at 'g' immediately.

White 62 is a purely territorial move: attacking the black group on the right takes priority. The point looks like 1 in Dia. 1; if Black counters with 2, White builds centre thickness up to 9. If instead Black 2 in Dia. 2, the group remains unsettled after 7.

Figure 2 (71 - 121)

White 76. Fleeing with 'a' would probably be better. White's aim is to link up with the group on the left. He achieves this but at a price: Black 87 etc. take away his eye shape. With 84, it would probably be better to connect at 87, giving up the two stones.




Figure 3 (122 - 207)

67: connects; ko: 98, 101, 104, 107

Black 99 should be at 100. After 102, White has a spare eye in sente with White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f', so he can tenuki. Black 99 could have lost the game.

However, Liu wastes his sente by making an overplay with 104. This stone is promptly swallowed up by Black. White should just have attached at 110 with the aim of expanding his bottom left area. That would probably have given him a promising game.


Liu fights on, trying to extract the maximum value from his captured stones as a sacrifice, but he is unable to turn the tables.

White resigns after Black 207.

Tesuji Magic


Yamabe Toshiro 9-dan

The solution to a tesuji problem often involves a startling leap of the imagination. See if you can put your imagination to work on the following problems, brought to you by the tesuji magician Yamabe. If you can solve these problems, your opponents will have good cause to fear you.




1. Black to play

If you strike at White's weak point, you should be able to rescue the eight black stones.



3. Black to play

One blow will fell the whole white group. There is no need to be satisfied with half of it.



5. Black to play


To solve this problem, you will have to quell some tough resistance by White.

Answers on page 54.

Good Style and Correct Shape


Rin Kaiho

In this series Rin Kaiho analyses the elements that make up good style and correct shape in a number of basic patterns. The theme of the series is how to use this knowledge to attack and defend correctly. The aim is not to give you sequences to memorize but to help you develop your feel for the game so that you will be able to find the correct move instinctively.




2. Black to play

Black can't kill White's corner group, so to save his own group he must counterattack.



4. Black to play


This problem is not as easy as it looks. You have to find White's strongest counter.



6. Black to play


This semeai looks a lot like a ko, but actually Black can do better.





Problem 9: Black to play

When White jumps to 1, there is a move that Black would very much like to play. Finding the move is not difficult, but please think about its ramifications.



Problem 10: Black to play

How should Black answer when White turns at 1? His response will vary depending on the degree of development of his moyo.


Answers on page 58

Bad Moves: How Many Points Do They Lose?

Ishida Yoshio


We are all only too well aware of the disastrous mistakes that lose us games, but to the professional eye the typical amateur game is more notable for small mistakes in style and in tactical thinking. The accumulation of small losses throughout a game may be just as costly as a big mistake.

In this series, Ishida Yoshio runs some typical amateur mistakes through his computer and comes up with numerical values for them. When you know how much a habitual mistake is costing you, it may be easier to avoid making it.



Mistake 9


Black 1 and 3, giving White the ponnuki, are moves to be avoided at all costs. Just how much does this mistake cost Black?



Mistake 10

Black 3 is the wrong follow-up to the cut. Do you know why and can you estimate how many points it loses?

Answers on page 59




Mistake 11

Black 2 is bad style; having made one mistake, Black follows up with another at 4. What are the correct moves for 2 and 4 and how much of a loss does Black suffer here?


Continued from page 52

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Obviously Black has to make a cut on the second line, but which side? If he cuts at 1, White connects at 2. If then Black 3, White 4 is a good answer. If Black 5, White plays 6 and wins the semeai. Instead of 5 —




Dia. 1: White wins




Dia. 2: White wins

Dia. 2. If Black 2 here, White makes one eye with 3, again putting him ahead in the semeai. That means that cutting on the right side is no good.


Dia. 3. If Black 1 and 3, White captures with 2 and 4. If then Black 5, Black again loses when White makes a second eye with 6 and 8.




Dia. 3: failure



Dia. 4: correct



Dia. 5: ko



Dia. 6: ko


Dia. 4. That means that the only move left is the diagonal connection at 5. This is the correct answer.

Dia. 5. If White 1, Black immediately makes the throw-in at 2, setting up a ko. If Black unthinkingly blocks at 'a' instead of 2, White promptly lives with 'b'. The timing is important. After White connects at 'c' after 2, Black kills him with the placement at 'b'.


Dia. 6. What happens if White answers the cut by descending at 2? This is of course designed to counter the diagonal connection of 5 in Dia. 4, but Black foils him with a diagonal connection on the other side with 3 and 5. If then White 6, Black still gets a ko with 7.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Black 1 looks like the 'vital point'. Black then attempts to make an eye in the centre with 3, but he is going to be disappointed. White just has to slide to 'a' to destroy the eye shape on the side and for that




Dia. 1: failure



Dia. 2: the tesuji


matter the eye in the centre can be destroyed too.

Dia. 2. Black has to strike more directly at the defect in White's shape and the way to do this is to cut at 1. After 2, Black ataris at 2, the idea being to spin White around on his heels.



*Dia. 3: follow-up
3: connects*

Dia. 3. If White 1, Black ataris at 2, then makes a throw-in at 4: this latter move is the deciding blow. (Note that White 1 at 2 makes no difference: Black just keeps putting him in atari.)




Dia. 4: no escape

Dia. 4. If White keeps connecting, Black captures the whole lot up to 5. This means that White had to sacrifice the two stones in Dia. 2.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. If you played without thinking, you would probably rush to capture two stones with the 1-3 combination. Black gains, but still


this has to be counted as a failure, as half the white group lives with 2 and 4.




Dia. 1: not good enough Dia. 2: no better

Dia. 2. If you think just a little, you might come up with Black 3. This is certainly a cleverer move, but the only difference is that Black captures a different part of White's group.


Dia. 3. White 2 is sente, so he lives with 4. Black again fails.



Dia. 3: failure



Dia. 4: the key move




Dia. 5: dead


Dia. 4. Black has to begin by cutting on the other side at 1. If White 2, he descends at 3; if White 4, Black 5 is the crucial move and the key to solving the problem.

Dia. 5. If White 1, Black captures two stones with 2 and 4 and this time White has been reduced to one eye. In short, 1 and 3 in Dia. 4 are the only way of putting White into dame-zumari (shortage of liberties).

Dia. 6. If White answers 1 by connecting at 2, he is helpless after 3 as he can't put Black into atari.




Dia. 6: helpless




Dia. 7: Black's counter

Dia. 7. If White connects at 1 instead of 1 in Dia. 5, Black counters with the placement at 2. If White next connects to the right of 1, Black connects to the right of 2, and once again White is unable to atari. Instead of 2 —



Dia. 8: a mistake

Dia. 8. Playing at 2 here is a mistake, as it lets White get a ko.




Dia. 9: dead

Dia. 9. White 1 doesn't work either, as Black 2 again puts him into dame-zumari. In fact, this time White dies in gote.

Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. It's obvious that Black has to start by cutting at 1. After 2 and 4, Black 5 is a good forcing move, but Black 7 next is uninspired. Expecting to get anywhere with the hane of 11 is wishful thinking. White 12 creates an eye, so Black can never atari. This is an abject failure.




Dia. 1: wrong

Dia. 2: the key move

Dia. 2. Making the cut at 7 is the key to solving this problem. Next —

Dia. 3. When White ataris at 1, Black hanes at 2. After 3 and 5, White is unable to atari on either side, so Black descends at 6 and wins. The whole white group has been destroyed, but this is not the correct answer, as White has a stronger answer.




Dia. 3: too good to be true

Dia. 4: correct


Dia. 4. White can avoid outright destruction by capturing at 2. Next —

Dia. 5. Black has no choice but to fight a ko with 1. This is the right answer. After 2 —

Dia. 6. Black has got time to connect at 1.



Dia. 5: a ko




Dia. 6


When he retakes at 3, he gets a direct ko, but White still has to add a move at 'a' to make it a direct ko for him. If White plays 2 at 'a', Black will take at 3 and then aim at killing the whole group by descending to 2.

Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. This problem looks small in scale, but it has quite a few variations. Black 1 looks like the vital point of White's eye space, but it is a bad move. White takes the other vital point with 2 and has no trouble living.




Dia. 1: wrong




Dia. 2: wrong

Dia. 2. Pushing through at 1 is much too slow. White lives even more easily.

Dia. 3. If Black jumps in at 1, White 2 stops Black from killing him unconditionally. Next —



Dia. 3: wrong



Dia. 4: ko


Dia. 4. The best Black can do is to get a ko up to 6. If White plays 2 at 4, a ko follows anyway with Black 2, White 5, Black 3.

Dia. 5. Could 1 here be the vital point? White demonstrates that it is not by getting a ko again.


Dia. 6. Black 1 likewise lets White get a ko. There has to be something better.

Dia. 7. The real vital point is the placement at 1. This is the only way of killing White unconditionally.


Dia. 8. White 2 is White's only conceivable




Dia. 5: wrong



Dia. 6: wrong




Dia. 7: the vital point




Dia. 8

answer. Attaching at 3 is then a clever follow-up. If White intercepts at 4, Black plays 5. Next —

Dia. 9. When White captures with 1, Black in turn captures 1, and White finds himself unable to make a second eye.



Dia. 9: dead




Dia. 10: dead


Dia. 10. If White intercepts immediately at 2, killing him is easy. Black 3 and 5 reduce him to one eye. If White plays 2 at 'a', Black 3 still kills him.

Answer to Problem 6

Dia. 1. If Black treats the position as an ordinary semeai and just fills in the liberties on the outside, White gets a ko with 2 and 4. Most people would probably play this way almost automatically in a game, but the player who scrutinizes the position a little more closely will be amply rewarded.




Dia. 1: ko



Dia. 2: the tesuji

Dia. 2. There is no getting around the fact that the white group on the side has four liberties, so the question becomes whether Black




Dia. 3: the cut




can increase his own liberties (in Dia. 1 he has three). The surprising answer is to crawl at 1.

Dia. 3. White of course ataris at 2, whereupon Black cuts at 3. The meaning of this cut is revealed —

Dia. 4. After Black recaptures at 1. White now has to capture the cutting stone before he can put the corner black group into atari, but in the meantime he finds that —




Dia. 4




Dia. 5: Black wins

Dia. 5. He has fallen behind in the corner semeai. Instead of a ko, Black now wins the fight unconditionally. Black 1 in Dia. 2 was a very effective sacrifice.

Dia. 6. White might try connecting at 2, but then —



Dia. 6



Dia. 7: Black wins

Dia. 7. Black takes the lead in the semeai all the same. After White 3, Black recaptures a stone, giving him three liberties to White's two.

(*'Let's Go'*, October & November 1984)




Good Style and Correct Shape: Answers

Continued from page 53

Answer to Problem 9

Dia. 1 (a gain). The forcing move of 1 is the obvious answer. White will probably answer at 2; his answering with a low move like this is what makes 1 a forcing move. Even if White later exchanges 'a' for Black 'b', Black will not have lost anything by making the 1-2 exchange. Even if White just jumps in at 'c', Black gains from having made this exchange.




Dia. 1: good

Dia. 2: bad

Dia. 2 (a bad move). Black 1 in Dia. 1 is not to be confused with 1 in this position, in which White simply has a three-space extension. In this case, Black 1 is a bad move, as it strengthens White and enables him to dispense with a further reinforcement (like the jump to 1 in Problem 9). You should take care not to confuse the two cases.

Dia. 3 (sacrifice strategy). Black 2 is a sacrifice. The idea is to make White jump to 3 so that Black can defend at 4 naturally. Black must not forget to attach at 6 after White 5. If White descends at 7, Black 6 becomes a good forcing move.

Black 2 has not died in vain, for there are still various kinds of aji in this shape.




Dia. 3: sacrifice

Dia. 4: attack

Dia. 4 (attack). Black 2 is the kind of move one makes when one is attacking. The concrete effect 2 has is to eliminate the possibility of White 'a' or 'b' while aiming at the gap of 'c'.

Dia. 5 (the thrust). White might answer with the thrusting move of 2, but Black is happy to solidify his corner by extending at 3.

Dia. 6 (the same idea). When White has




Dia. 5

Dia. 6

defended his extension by making the knight's move of 1, Black 2 is still a good forcing move. White will answer at 3, as White 'a' would turn 1 into a slack move.

Answer to Problem 10

Dia. 1. When Black's moyo is still not fully developed, he should answer the marked white move by defending solidly at 1. At an early stage of the opening, this will in most cases be the correct move.



Dia. 1: solid

Dia. 2: bad aji


Dia. 2 (the aji of the peep). One's natural inclination is to block at 1, but this gives White the aji of the peep at 'a'. At a later stage he may be able to use it as a foothold for destroying Black's area. The precondition for playing 1 is that this aji does not worry Black. In any case, 1 is an all-out move.

Dia. 3 (no worries). Let's suppose that White has played the two marked stones to reduce Black's moyo. In this case, Black will feel much more confident if he has played the marked black stone rather than blocking at 'a'.


Actually, if White plays the marked stone in Dia. 1 at an early stage in the game, Black should feel grateful for the chance to solidify his position by jumping to 1.

Dia. 4 (the diagonal move). In this position, dropping back to 1 is conceptually similar.


Dia. 5 (greedy). Many players would block at 1 without thinking. This wouldn't matter if White had the bottom area walled off, but otherwise




Dia. 3: good aji



Dia. 4: solid




Dia. 5: too greedy




Dia. 6: simple

White will suffer to some degree from giving Black the aji of the peep at 'a'. White 1 is a greedy move.

Dia. 6 (keeping things simple). In this position



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Black is quite happy to answer White 1 at 2.

Dia. 7 (bad aji). Black may want to block at 1 because he has a three-space extension. However, this gives White the aji of a cut at 'a' and a peep at 'b'.


It is worth remembering that playing thickly, especially at an early stage, is like putting money in the bank.

Dia. 8 (the vital point). Black 2 is the proper answer to White 1. If instead Black blocks at 'a', White will gain from getting the aji of the peep at 2.

('Kido', May 1986)

Bad Moves: How Many Points Do They Lose?


Answers



Pattern 9: Black 5 and 7 lose over 10 points.

This pattern arises from the invasion at 1. The wedge at 3 is OK, but 5 is a bad move: it can only be described as a fit of insanity. Unfortunately, there are people out there in the go clubs who play like this. They may feel that they have taken a lot of profit by cutting off the solitary white stone, but this of course is a hallucination. The minus from giving White the ponnuki exceeds ten points. Whatever you do, never play like this. Starting out with Black 1 at 3, followed by White 4, Black 1, gives the same situation.

Dia. 1. Black may have cut off the white stone, but it's still got a lot of life in it. White can play 1 and 3 at any time. If next Black 'a', White plays a ko with 'b'. If instead Black




Dia. 1


'c', White plays 'd', Black 'a', White 'b', again giving a ko. Since White has already taken profit on the left, the burden of this ko is lighter for him. Answering White 3 with Black 'e' would be solid, but then White would live with 'f', Black 'c', White 'd'. What Black gained from cutting off the marked white stone would now be obscure.

Well then, how should Black play? The main consideration is not to give White the ponnuki.

Dia. 2. When White ataris at 1, extending at 2 is the only move. White will probably have to connect at 3, so then Black can play 4. The result is the reverse of Pattern 9: this time Black gets the ponnuki, so he's more than satisfied. Instead of 3 —



Dia. 2




Dia. 3


Dia. 3. If White 1 here, Black can set up a ladder with 2 and 4. He could also be more persistent and atari at 'a' instead of 4.

Dia. 4. White's play in Dias. 2 and 3 is too uninventive. He might instead try pushing down at 1 here. Black forces with 2, then extends at 4. The continuation to 8 is a joseki for the side, so it is worth remembering.

This is the result that has to be compared to Pattern 9. The amount of profit is similar, but there is a world of difference in thickness. I consider this difference as being worth more than ten points. If you played Pattern 9 in a game, you couldn't expect to win.




Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Dia. 5. If White answers on the outside at 4, you still must not give him a ponnuki. Connecting at 5 is the correct move. The sequence to 9 is a joseki.



Pattern 10: Black 6 loses 5 points.


The 1-3 combination is a standard tactic employed by White in handicap games. Black 4 is essential, but Black 6 is strange. There are some books that say that Black 6 is OK when the ladder favours Black, but that's a lie.



Dia. 1


Dia. 1. If the ladder is bad for Black, he has to link up with 2 and 4. If this doesn't strike you as being painfully submissive on Black's part, you have to remember that it is. It's the reverse of Dia. 2 in Pattern 9.

Instead of 6 in Pattern 10 —



Dia. 2


Dia. 2. The correct move is Black 1. The sequence to 7 is a joseki. White's thickness is similar to that in Dia. 1, but there is a big difference in the size of Black's territory. I assess this difference at five points.



Dia. 3

Dia. 3. I can't recommend Black 6 in Pattern 10 even when the ladder is favourable for Black. White can aim at playing a ladder block at the


worst time for Black or he could even start operations immediately with 1 and 3 here. Going all out to capture the two marked stones is not interesting.



Dia. 4


Dia. 4. From White's point of view, he must at all costs avoid giving Black a ponnuki by playing the atari at 5. This is the reverse of Pattern 9. If the player taking white did something like this, his opponent would be justified in asking to exchange colours. Compared to the previous diagram, White loses almost ten points.

Whatever the circumstances, letting the opponent make a ponnuki of a stone that could have escaped is taboo.



Pattern 11: Black loses nearly 5 points.

Black 2 and 4 are extremely crude moves. A player with good style would probably find it unbearable to watch such moves being played. However, it is not so easy to say just how bad they are. In a sense, they are quite solid, so let's provisionally say that they lose a little under five points. That they lose points is beyond question, but Black doesn't get a terrible position.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1. Next, extending at 1 is the only move for White. Black 2 and 4 are excellent moves.


White will probably make shape with 5. Black defends at 8 and aims at attacking White. Wouldn't you say that the game is going well for Black? If he played this well, White would have to give up.

The problem is that I don't believe that a player who could make the bad moves of 2 and 4 in pattern 11 would be able to continue as well as this. Even though the result in Pattern 10 may not be as bad as it looks, I don't want anyone to imitate it, which is why I call it a five-point loss.

Dia. 2. While we're about it, let's have a look at what happens when Black cuts at 1 here. This is a variation that aggressive players might enjoy, though it is doubtful that one can improve on the result in Pattern 11. White should be able to settle his group with the 2-4 combination. He can be satisfied with the result to 10 here. Instead of 3 —




Dia. 2



Dia. 3


Dia. 3. If Black extends at 1, White plays the stylish combination of 2 and 4 to pull his group out. He is also satisfied with this result.



Dia. 4

Dia. 4. The most straightforward answer to White 1 is the hane at 2. Black could also try the strong counter-hane at 'a', but I recommend playing 2. If White 3, Black strikes at the vital point with 4, which will cause White a lot of trouble. White can hardly make bad shape by connecting at 'a', but if he plays 'b', Black pulls back at 'c', and Black 4 remains just as much a thorn in his side.


With such an effective sequence as this available, there is no reason for Black to resort to the blunt moves in Pattern 11. If White plays



Dia. 5

3 at 'a', a black hane at 3 makes a good, taut shape.


Dia. 5. Some players may be worried about the crosscut at 3, but if this kind of move worries you, you had better find another game. Answering docilely with 4 to 8 is good enough, but actually Black has a better answer. Instead of 4 –



Dia. 6

Dia. 6. This time thrusting into White with 1 works perfectly. If White 2, Black extends at 3, securing a large profit. It is now too late for White to salvage anything. If White 'a', Black either answers at 'b' or counters with 'c'. That means that White can't block at 2, so –

Dia. 7. He probably has to capture with 2. Black seizes the opportunity to link up all his forces with 3 and 5. The fight ends with White



Dia. 7

6.

What do you think of this result? White has invaded and lived inside Black's position, but you shouldn't let that upset you. White's gains are minute. In contrast, the thickness Black gains from linking up from right to left dominates the whole board. If this happened to me in a four-stone game, I would lose the will to fight on. Winning is out of the question for White.

You can see now why it would be the height of folly for Black to play 2 in Pattern 11 when he has sequences like those in Dias. 6 and 7 available to him. Not to put too fine a point on it, White 1 in Pattern 11 is unreasonable. Players giving a handicap brazen-facedly play this kind of move, but why let them get away with it?

One concept that comes out in this discussion of play in handicap games is that rather than thinking of how to take profit, you should think of how not to suffer a loss. This is the key to improvement.

(*'Let's Go'*, April 1985)

12th Tengen Title

One of the most interesting clashes of 1986 was that between Sonoda Yuichi and Kobayashi Koichi in the Tengen title match. Sonoda, with his ultra-Takemiya-style moyo strategy, brought a breath of fresh air into the go world.

This was Sonoda's second bid to take the Tengen title (he lost 1–3 to Shimamura in the 3rd title match in 1977) and his chances seemed to be very good, as he was enjoying outstanding form. To become the challenger, he defeated Takemiya, Ishida Yoshio, Kato, and Yamashiro. In contrast, the defending champion Kobayashi had only just emerged from perhaps the worst slump in his career. Beginning with his four

straight losses to Kato in the Meijin title match, he lost all six games he played in September and October.

In the first game Sonoda did not give Kobayashi any help in regaining his confidence. He displayed to the full his mastery of centre fighting; he couldn't have asked for a better start to the title match.

Game One

White: Sonoda Yuichi 9-dan (Kansai Ki-in)

Black: Kobayashi Koichi, Kisei, Tengen & Judan
Played in Kobe on 13 November 1986.

Commentary by Tono Hiroaki 9-dan.






Figure 1 (1 - 70)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 1 (1 - 70). *Black mishandles the ladder block.*

White 8, 10. The Sonoda style, going for the centre. If White makes a diagonal connection at 'a', Black will hane at 'b'.


Black 25 keeps things simple. Black could play a more complicated variation with Black 25 at 26.

White 30 seems to be better than pressing at 32 immediately. If the latter, then before answering 32 Black will play 'c' in sente, which will help him in the centre more than 31.


Black 35. Black could also follow Dia. 1. He lives in sente with 3 and 5, so next he can switch to 'd' in the figure.

Black 47 is bad as it gives White a good move at 48. The continuation to 53 is a joseki which gives a more or less equal result. However, if it's equal, that means that Black has gained nothing from his ladder block at 45 to compensate for White's gain from his ponnuki at 54. Instead of 47 —


Dia. 2. Black should hane at 1. White must




Dia. 3



Dia. 5



Dia. 4



Dia. 6

capture at 54 in the figure, so Black can continue with 3 to 7. Black can now aim at attacking at 'a'. Resisting with 2 and 4 in Dia. 3 looks a little unreasonable, considering that White has to worry about the ladder (i.e. Black 54).

With 54 Sonoda takes the lead.

Black 55 is a determined move. The continuation to 66 is forced, but Kobayashi admitted that he didn't accomplish much here. The reason of course is that Black's side position is still open further up the left side. An alternative approach (suggested by Sato Sunao 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in) for 55 would be to play 1 to 5 in Dia. 4, then wait to see what White does. If White 'a', Black could then try 'b'.

Black 67 is a necessary reinforcement. Without it, White cannot answer 1 in Dia. 5 at 2, as White continues with the troublesome crosscut of 3 and 5.

Black 69 prepares to sacrifice the two stones 63 and 65, this being the lesser of two evils. The greater evil is shown in Dia. 6. Black saves the two stones and lives but White 'a', threatening 'b', is sente, so White can jump in at 'c'.

The trouble Black is having finding a coherent strategy shows how well the game is going for White.






Figure 2 (71 - 110)



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Figure 2 (71 - 110). *Centre influence proves its value.*

White 78. White 90 is worth about 20 points, but Black 'a' would also secure about 20 points.

Black 83. If Black 1 in Dia. 7, White will hane at 2, then switch to 90 in the figure. The best Black can do in this corner is to get a ko, but since White can aim at attaching at 'a', Black prefers to let him live in gote.

Black 89. The game is lost for Black after White 90, so perhaps he should have linked up with 1 in Dia. 7. Kobayashi was worried about the threat of White 2, but Tono felt that Black could afford to compromise with 3 to 7. Of course, White can pick up a further 12 points or so with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', but at least this way Black might be able to make a game

of it.

Black 97. Black 'b' would be more solid, but then White would be happy to defend at 104.

Black 101. If at 'c', White 'd' will be nasty.

White 102. Sonoda sets out to wind up the game. Kobayashi thought long and hard about his answer but was unable to find an effective resistance. If Black plays 103 at 104, Black's crosscut at 103 is hard to handle; if 103 at 107, then White 103 works well.




Figure 3 (111 - 144)

Ko: 32, 35, 38, 41, 44

Figure 3 (111 - 144). *An unwinnable ko*

Black 11 really should be at 14, though even then Black would be a little behind. Possibly Kobayashi overlooked White 20.

Black 23. If at 39, Black has no answer to White 'a'.


Black 25. Any other move lets White live, but all the same this is a forlorn hope. White takes advantage of his wealth of ko threats to set up a ko with 26 and 28. This is the best and simplest way to settle the issue. After 44, Black bows to the inevitable.

With this convincing start Sonoda must have been pleased with his prospects of taking the title. The Kansai Ki-in must also have been anticipating an end to its drought in titles (its last open title was the 1981 Oza title won by Hashimoto Shoji and the last one before that was the same player's 1974 Judan title).

(Translated from the Tokyo Newspaper by John Power. Games 2 to 4 will be given in GW48.)

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
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